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Abstract

This thesis traces the development of the concept of the
common heritage of mankind from its introduction by Arvid
Pardo, the Ambassador to the United Nations from Malta, in
1967 to its translation into policy in the 1982 Third United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The thesis pays
particular attention to the people and ideas that influenced
Pardo and the historical period of the late 1960s in which the
common heritage idea for the deep seabed was articulated. It
was a period of international idealism and a brief period in
which the United States President, Lyndon Johnson, lent his
grandiose rhetoric to the idea of managing the deep oceans as a
common heritage. However, the problem was that the idea
could not be translated into workable public policy for
international cooperation in mining the deep seabed. The idea
became a vehicle for a number of groups and individuals
including the Third World nations that wanted to make it a
part of their demands for ·a new economic order. Although a
seabed mining regime was negotiated and is in place in the
treaty, the United States and some other developed nations
refused· to sign the treaty because of the seabed regime. Other
events that hurt the process of turning the common heritage
idea into workable policy were the decline in demand for
minerals and a global recession that made such an expensive
enterprise less attractive.
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This thesis is also an examination of how a small group of
visionaries were able to promote an idea and place it on a
global agenda. Despite the fact that seabed mining has yet to
take place and the treaty remains unratified ten years after its
completion, the general issues that the common heritage idea
raised has not evaporated. International environmental
diplomacy today depends on nations devising ways to manage
resources in common such as the ocean, rainforests and the
atmosphere. This diplomacy also depends on the ability of the
more wealthy industrialized nations to cooperate with the
poorer, less developed countries. This form of cooperation
failed with seabed mining. But it must eventually succeed with
more vital global resources.
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Introduction

International political changes and oceanographic
advances set the stage at the end of the 1960s for a rare
flowering of idealism.

Nurtured by this period of idealism, a

little-known ambassador from Malta, Arvid Pardo, declared
that the deep seabed should be considered the common
heritage of mankind in 1967 .1 The idea appealed to the world's
developing countries and was turned into a United Nations
resolution that the United States, other powerful developed
countries and developing countries supported in 1970.2 The
common heritage concept was expressed to the world again at
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). At this conference, representatives from 140 nations
that did not include the United States agreed in 1982 that the
deep seabed together with its resources should be considered
the common heritage of mankind, a place to be managed by an
international authority and to be mined for the enrichment of
all nations, in particular the world's developing nations. But for
a number of reasons, the concept could not be translated into
workable international policy for the deep seabed.
Pardo drew upon an ancient belief that the ocean
belonged to no man, no nation, but to all people of all nations
when he shaped the common heritage concept. This belief was
1. United Nations, General Assembly, (Doc. A/C.l/PV. 1515, 1516), 1 November
1967.
2. United Nations, General Assembly, Res. 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970.

1

taken for granted when the ocean was a dangerous and remote
place. But as technology began to remove the barriers to this no
man's land, Pardo believed the chances increased that powerful
maritime nations would take control of increasing amounts of
ocean space and ocean wealth.

It was this concern that set the

stage for a new definition of the ocean as the common heritage
of mankind.

In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly

passed a resolution at the urging of Pardo that defined the
common heritage as: "the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as
well as the resources of the area ... "3
Technology, primarily improved equipment to extract oil
from beneath the continental shelf and new instruments to
examine the deep sea, provided the backdrop for the common
heritage concept. However, scientists did not play as significant
a role in developing policy for the deep seabed as political
leaders. But the political leaders drew extensively of the
writings of John Mero, a California engineer, who was one of
the first to proclaim a great wealth of minerals in the seabed.4
His ideas, which would later come under scrutiny and
criticism,5 were picked up by nonscientific world-stage players
and used extensively to spearhead the common heritage
concept in the 1970s.

3. Ibid.
4.· John Mero, The Mineral Resources of the Sea (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1965).
5. Markus Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), p. 12.
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This thesis focuses on the individuals who articulated,
defined and promoted the principle of the common heritage of
mankind and applied it to the world's oceans.
of these players varied.

The motivations

For some, the concept was a vehicle to

achieve the so-called New International Economic Order6 by
devising a way to include the emerging nations as managers of
the ocean's deep seabed.
movement.7

It was the first significant test of this

For others, the common heritage was an old idea

that had not worked in other places, but might be successfully
applied to a new place - the deep seabed.8 For certain
members of the nongovernmental organization movement, the
common heritage was a way of achieving world federalism and
For others, it was a way of trying

a step toward world peace.9

to distribute the wealth of the oceans in a more egalitarian
manner. For some who were acting out roles assigned by their
governments, it was a bargaining tool, a concept they might not
have agreed to at any other time, but one that could be used as
quid pro quo to get Third World nations· to agree to other
provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea.1 o

6. P.N. Agarwala, The New International Economic Order: An Overview (New York:
Pergamon Press, 1983).
7. Barbara Weaver, former activist with United Methodist Law of the Sea Project,
personal interview with author, New York City, 20 September 1991.
8. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, et al., eds., The Tides of Change: Peace, Pollution and
Potential of the Oceans (New York: Mason/Charter, 1975).
9. John Logue, ed., The Fate of the Oceans (Villanova: World Order Research
Institute, 1972).
10. Claiborne Pell, "Introduction," San Diego Law Review, vol. 18, no. 3 (1981): p.
391.
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The hypothesis of this study is that the doctrine of the
common heritage of mankind was a vehicle for many other
goals - goals that were not always grounded in political,
economic or technological reality.

The political reality during

the period when the idea was introduced was that there were
enormous philosophical differences between some
industrialized nations and the majority of developing countries
on how much political power an international organization
should have over what would be a business enterprise, mining
the seabed for minerals. These differences made cooperation
between countries with divergent philosophies difficult to
negotiate. The doctrine was also touted at a time when
industrialized nations feared a shortage of land-based minerals
and feared they might be held captive by OPEC-like mineral
cartels.11 These countries were looking for a new source of
minerals that might be extracted from nuetral territory.
However, the metal shortage abated by the 1980s when metal
prices dropped worldwide, making seabed mining much less
viable and an international mining venture less urgent.

The

concept was also based on an assumption that the technology to
mine seabed minerals would become more accessible to
developing countries in the near future. Time proved that this
was unrealistic because seabed mining has not been done by
developed or developing countries.

1i. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Report of
Congressional Research Service on Deep Seabed Minerals: Resources, Diplomacy,
and Strategic Interest, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 March 1978.
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The mining regime that developed at UNCLOS from the
common heritage concept was not equipped to weather the
rapidly changing nature of world politics or world economics.
The regime included production controls and allowed for
extensive control of private industry by the international
organization. In the last two decades, criticism of government
intervention in the market-place has grown. The fall of
communism in Eastern Europe in the 1990s has caused policymakers to question the political viability of state-controlled
economies. This general critique has helped to discredit the
mining regime.
The people who first articulated the common heritage
concept to the world, Arvid Pardo and Elisabeth Mann Borgese,
who was to serve as an Austrian delegate to UNCLOS,
envisioned a powerful international organization that would
regulate oil drilling, mineral mining, scientific research,
military use and environmental protection of an area of ocean
space that would begin just beyond the territorial sea.

The

resulting 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea seabed provisions did not create such a broad and powerful
entity.

The treaty created a regime for mining seabed

manganese nodules in an area beyond the newly created
Exclusive Economic Zone.12 The United States and some other
industrialized nations rejected the entire seabed portion of the
12.

The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond the territorial sea which
extends 200 miles beyond the baseline of a nation. It is defined in Part V of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in International
Legal Materials, vol. XXI, no. 6, (November 1982): p. 1279.
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treaty and have yet to sign the convention.

This has left

international marine policy with an unsuccessful doctrine.
A major goal of the thesis is to set a precedent by writing
an intellectual history that identifies the thinkers who
developed, articulated, shaped and promoted a significant
doctrine of modern ocean law.

The thesis also examines that

moment in history when marine policy coalesced around the
common heritage concept.

Heightened understanding of this

moment and the thinkers and ideas that helped create it could
assist future leaders in marine affairs to form new ideas and
translate them into policy. The evolution of the common
heritage concept and its failure to create viable economic policy
might also provide policy-makers with some warnings of
possible pitfalls.
Yet, this thesis does not conclude the common heritage
was a complete failure. Although the concept has not yet
resulted in seabed mining that contributes wealth to the
world's poorer nations, it does promote worldwide acceptance
that the deep seabed belongs to all people and is not to be
carved up among nations. The extensive discussion of creating
a new international law infused the emerging field of marine
affairs with excitement and energy.
This study is significant because few writers have
examined the people behind the ideas that form the foundation
of marine affairs.13

Yet in other fields, the thinkers become

13. Biographies have been written about Hugo Grotius, one of the founding fathers
of international ocean law. See Edward Dumbauld, The Life and Legal Writings of
Hugo Grotius (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969).
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well known not only to those in the field but to the outside
world.

The public has learned about the fields of science, law,

philosophy and history by examining inspirational leaders,
their motivations and their choices.

The author hopes that

applying this same approach to a selected marine affairs
doctrine will assist not only the academic community, but the
general public to better understand the evolution of marine
affairs.
Some of the questions that are posed in this thesis are:
Who are the primary thinkers who created and shaped the
common heritage concept and what were their motivations?
What were the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches
taken by the people who promoted the idea? How broadly
based were their constituencies?

To what extent did the

principle of the common heritage of mankind gain international
acceptance as seen in United Nations resolutions and the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea? What might be the long
term effect of the doctrine?
The first chapter of this study is an examination of
Ambassador Arvid Pardo's introduction of the concept of the
common heritage of mankind in 1967. The chapter delves into
some of the predecessors to Pardo's idea and explains the
historical context in which Pardo defined the concept. It
presents some background on Pardo and examines his
motivations. The second chapter introduces some of the

7

advocates of the common heritage concept. Some of the
strongest advocates were individual people who had worked
for the causes of international peace and social justice. This
chapter pays particular attention to the role that Elisabeth
Mann Borgese, a German-born internationalist, played
promoting Pardo's ideas and building an international
constituency for a broad array of marine issues. The chapter
also examines some of the fledgling United States
nongovernmental groups that promoted the concept.

The third

chapter examines the marriage of the common heritage concept
with the Third World aspirations for what was called a New
International Economic Order. The fourth chapter is an analysis
of what became of Pardo's idea for a common heritage regime
for the oceans. The analysis looks at the policy that emerged in
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the
preparatory commission work after the treaty negotiations and
the United States increasing disenchantment with the concept.
The final chapter is a conclusion and evaluation of the common
heritage of mankind concept.
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Chapter I - The Common Heritage of Mankind is
Introduced.

Arvid Pardo, the ambassador from the tiny island
country of Malta, submitted a proposal to the United Nations on
August 17, 1967 that would contribute to a major change in
global thinking.

Ambassador Pardo said years later that he

was motivated by a dream in 1967 when he proposed
General Assembly include on its agenda a

the

"Declaration and

Treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful
purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the
seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the
use of their resources in the interests of mankind." 1 Pardo
was also motivated by a deep desire to encourage a new style
of international relations that would revamp the pattern of
economic, political and geographic control by wealthy,
industrialized nations.2
Nations on

In a three-hour speech at the United

November 1, i967, Pardo gave the world a first

glimpse of his idea that the deep seabed and its resources
should be considered the "common heritage of mankind."
Pardo linked the common heritage idea to the history of
ocean law.

He suggested that the world had reached a new era

in ocean use that demanded a novel legal concept to govern the

L Arvid Pardo, telephone interview with author, 2 December 1991 and Note
verbale from U.N. (Doc. A/6695), 17 August 1967.
2. ibid., Note verbale.
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previously ignored area of the deep seabed.3

His idea took

hold in the late 1960s largely because it combined a number of
international concerns including the ocean environment,
disarmament, the future of lesser-developed countries and a
critique of liberal capitalism. Global attention was turning
toward the ocean as one of the last areas on earth that had not
been claimed, explored or exploited. It was also a time when
the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a
scientific race to explore outer space. Leaders of smaller
countries that had more at stake in the ocean than in outer
space did not want to see the two global powers fight for
control of the oceans and their resources. The danger that such
a competition posed was not just that one side would lose
resources to the other, but also of war on the planet.
Pardo's idea also took hold because he was echoing some
earlier suggestions of what should be done with the ocean's
deep seabed and its resources. The precursors to Pardo's idea
can be traced to ancient Roman Law.
The Institutes of Justinian, the body of Roman law, states
that under the Law of Nature "these things are common to
mankind - the air, running water, the sea and consequently the
shores of the sea."4

In Roman law these common areas were

considered res nullius or res communis. Res nullius referred to
something which while not owned could eventually be owned
by someone. International law developed so that there were
3~ U.N. (Doc. A/C.l/PV. 1515, 1516), 1 November 1967.
4. Thomas C. Sandars, ed., The Institutes of Justinian (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1922), p. 90
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various ways for countries to claim property said to be res
nullius.5

However, if an area was considered res communis, it

was owned by the community of mankind and therefore could
not be claimed. Pardo drew from these ancient concepts when
he fashioned his concept of the common heritage of mankind.
His concept, as will be explained, resembled the res communis.
Technology for offshore oil drilling and improved
oceanographic research thrust the seabed into the international
legal arena in 1958 at the First Conference on the Law of the
Sea.

Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand stated at that

conference that the "sea is the common heritage of mankind."6
However, the conference did not establish a legal regime for
the seabed. It was not yet a compelling issue; the use of the
seabed was still in the realm of science fiction for most people.
During the 1950s and the 1960s, some people began
suggesting that the United Nations be given jurisdiction over
the seabed.

The Commission to Study the Organization of

Peace, an American group, urged in 1957 that the United
Nations General Assembly · "declare the title of the international
community" to the deep seabed and establish administrative
arrangements.

Clark Eichelberger, a member

of the

commission, a proponent of United Nations jurisdiction,

5. Henry Black, Black's Law Dictionary ,5th Edition (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Co., 1979), p. 1174.
6. Cited in Bernardo Zuleta, "Introduction," San Diego Law Review, vol. 17 (1980):
p. 524.
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suggested it was a way of providing the international body
with its first independent source of money .1
Pardo's speech

also echoed an idea that had at least been

hinted at in American marine policy. Although he spoke in
nowhere near the detail as Pardo, President Lyndon B. Johnson
alluded to the concept of a common heritage on the seabed m
1966 when he commissioned the USS Oceanographer and
issued a report on the ocean composed by the President's
Science Advisory Committee.8

The Johnson speech and the

report entitled, Effective Use of the Sea,9

signaled that United

States policy-makers were ready to address the seabed.
Johnson's speech at the commissioning of the research vessel
also demonstrated optimism about ocean policy.

The 1960s

were the American heydey in ocean policy .1 o The ocean was
high on the national agenda for a combination of reasons
including a rebirth in science education fueled by the space
race between the Soviets and the Americans, specific ocean
technology advances, the beginnings of an environmental
movement stessing land and water protection and a search by
the United States for ways of creating international bonds

7. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Ocean
Space, Hearings on Activities of Nations in Ocean Space, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 24
July 1969, p. 150.
8. Public Papers of the President, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, p. 722.
9. Effective Use of the Sea, Report of the Panel on Oceanography of the President's
Science Advisory Committee (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
June 1966).
10. Lauriston R. King and Feenan D. Jennings, "The Executive and the Oceans:
Three Decades of United States Marine Policy," Marine Technology Society Journal,
vol. 22, no. 1 (1988): p. 17-32.
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through programs such as the Peace Corps, Food for Peace and
the U.S. Administration for International Development.

The

tone of the era was set by the grandiose idealism of Johnson's
Great Society programs. The language President Johnson used
in his July 13, 1966 dedication of the Oceanographer gives a
flavor of the attitude toward the ocean at the time.
"We meet here today at the beginning of a new age of
exploration," Johnson told a gathering at Pier 2 in the
Washington Navy Yard. "To some this might mean our
adventures in outer space. But I am speaking of exploring an
unknown world at our doorstep. It is really our last frontier
here on earth. I am speaking of the mountain chains that are
yet to be discovered, of natural resources that are yet to be
tapped, of a vast wilderness that is yet to be charted.
This is the sea around us." 1 1
Not only does the speech's rhetoric tap into the American
myth of the frontier, but it also alludes to the best-selling book
on the ocean published by Rachel Carson · in 1951.12 In the
speech, Johnson explained that the Oceanographer, one of the
Coast and Geodetic Survey's fourteen research ships, would
improve the country's understanding of the ocean. He said
federal · support for marine science was on the rise from an
estimated $21 million in 1950 to $320 million in 1960. He
stressed the need for cooperation especially between the Soviet
Union and the United States in scientific research and he
11. Public Papers, LBJ, p. 722.
12. Rachel Carson, The Sea Around Us (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951 ).
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announced that the nation would invite other countries to
participate in a round-the-world voyage of the Oceanographer.
In the closing sentences of his speech, Johnson called the ocean
floor a "legacy to all humans."
We greatly welcome this type of international
participation. Because under no circumstances, we
believe, must we ever allow the prospects of rich
harvests and mineral wealth to create a new form of
colonial competition among the maritime nations. We
must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the
lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep
seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of
all human beings.13
On the same day that Johnson delivered this speech, he
also issued Effective Use of the Sea. The report was the result
of a year of study and work by the President's Science
Advisory Committee, a group composed predominantly of
academics. It appeared just as Congress was enacting the
Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act .
report and the act concluded that the

Un~ted

Both the

States lacked an

adequate program to "explore, understand and develop the
oceans." 14

The report detailed a history of American

ignorance of the vast oceans at its western and eastern
doorsteps. It echoed some of the conclusions of a 1959 report
by a National Academy of Science Committee on Oceanography
which said the United States was uncompetitive and not in an
international leadership position in oceanography. Effective Use

13.
14.

Public Papers, LBJ, 722.
Effective Use of the Sea, p. vii.
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of the Sea

recommended establishing a new agency to oversee

ocean and atmosphere issues.

The phrase, common heritage of

mankind, was not used in Effective Use of the Sea, however, the
report urged "cooperative, international efforts to develop
marine resources for the benefit of humanity."

And it urged

the United States to assert itself quickly or risk losing a voice m
an emerging new order for the oceans. I 5
During the summer of 1966, Congress also enacted the
Great Society's program for the ocean, called the Marine
Resources and Engineering Development Act.16

This act

created the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and
Resources, a 15-member president-appointed body to identify
national objectives for ocean research, environmental
protection and fish and resource development. The commission,
headed by Julius Stratton, was made up of appointees drawn
from government, industry, universities and laboratories. It
issued a report, called the Stratton Report, in 1969, calling for
major national ocean technology improvements, a federal-state
coastal zone management program, improved use and
management of national and international fisheries and greater
national attention to the formation of international
cooperatives to use and protect the deep oceans.
The Johnson speech and the Stratton Commission's
beginnings were in the background when Pardo made his
15. Ibid., p. 3.
16. Our Nation and The Sea: A Plan for National Action, Report of the Commission
on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1969).
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speech. Also, the World Peace Through Law Center, an
organization representing more than 200 lawyers from 100
countries, resolved in July 1967 that there should be an
international regime to manage the deep seabed. New York
lawyer Aaron L. Danzig organized the meeting of the United
Nations Committee of the World Peace Through Law Center
which recommended to its parent organization that the high
seas and all its fish and mineral resources be subject to U .N.
jurisdiction. The parent body, however, limited the
recommendation to non-fishery resources of the high seas.

The

organization resolved:
Whereas, new technology and oceanography have
revealed the possibility of exploitation of untold
resources of the high seas and the bed thereof
beyond the continental shelf and more than half of
mankind finds itself underprivileged, underfed and
underdeveloped, and the high seas are the common
heritage of all mankind .1 7
Pardo disagreed with the idea of placing the United
Nations in charge of this vast territory and made this clear m
his speech. In this way, he deviated from a number of thinkers.
Calling United Nations oversight impractical, Pardo thought it
"hardly · likely that those countries that have already developed
a technical capability to exploit the seabed would agree to an
international regime if it were administered by a body where
small countries, such as mine, had the same voting power as
17. Lewis Alexander, ed., International Rules and Organization for the Sea:
Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, June
24-27, 1968 (Kingston, RI: The University of Rhode Island, 1968), p. 375.
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the United States or the Soviet Union."18 He suggested that
industrialized countries should have more to say about
managing the seabed than the lesser developed countries.
Pardo also laid out in clear language (I) the reasons for a new
concept in ocean management, (2) the danger in not creating a
new legal concept for governing the oceans (3) the specific
advantages of exploiting the seabed and ( 4) a general design
for a regime to govern the ocean as a common heritage of
mankind.
Pardo noted in his speech that the nations of the world
had accepted the concept of freedom of the seas as defined by
Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century .19

This concept

covered the uses of the water component of the seas, but Pardo
believed it did not address the seabed beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
Around the use of the surface and upper layers of
the seas a complex body of international law has
developed; but the depths of the oceans and the ocean
floor were of little interest until little more than a
hundred years ago when the question of laying
transatlantic cable came to the fore.20
P~do

also stressed the need for a new legal concept

because he believed the 1958 United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea Convention on the Continental Shelf had left
ambiguity in the definition of the continental shelf.

He

18. U.N. (Doc. A/C.l/PV.1516), 1 November 1967.
19. Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations, 5th Edition (London: Macmillan
Publishing Co., 1986), p. 31.
20. U.N. ( Doc. A/C.l/PV.1515), 1 November 1967.
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maintained the treaty's definition gave nations freedom to
broadly interpret how far the continental shelf extended and
thus the extent of a nation's right to exploit the resources of the
shelf. National territory at the time Pardo gave his speech
extended for many, but not all nations, to a three-mile
territorial sea. Beyond this, the 1958 treaty gave a nation
rights to exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf,
but did not grant sovereignty over the shelf to coastal states.2 1
Pardo referred to the following section of the 1958 convention
when he argued that it left a dangerous ambiguity and left
room for international disputes over where a nation's shelf
ended and the seabed began .
... the term continental shelf is used as referring (a) to the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 metres or, beyond the limit, to where
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas ... 2 2
Under such a definition, technology . and the ability to
exploit would define where the shelf ended and the seabed
began. Obviously it gave clear advantages to nations with
superior technology and Pardo was worried it might encourage
these nations to make claims to the deep seabed area.
Pardo urged that a new legal framework for the vast
ocean seabed should be established before governments used

21. 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Convention on the
Continental Shelf, Art. 2, 29 April 1958, Treaties and Other International Acts
Series 5 5 7 8 .
22. Ibid. Art. 1.
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current international law to justify occupation, military
buildup, nuclear weapons installation or commercial
exploitation of the seabed.

He wanted to devise a new concept

for the ocean that differed from the legal concept of res nullius
which formed the philosophical foundation for the concept of
freedom of the seas. Under the concept of res nullius, there are
parts of the globe that are owned by no one. But internationally
accepted legal methods exist to gain sovereignty over these
areas. The primary method is through discovery and
occupation. 23

The concept of res nullius ushered in the age of

exploration and allowed Europeans to claim continents and
colonize peoples who did not have the same form of written,
international law.
Pardo's idea of the common heritage of mankind more
closely resembled the Roman legal concept called "res
communis." Under the concept of res communis, an area may
not be appropriated and the use of it belongs equally to all
people.24

This is the philosophical underpinning of the

common heritage concept. However, Pardo and other scholars
have pointed out that the common heritage concept went
beyond res communis because it included "the actual sharing of
the benefits" derived from an area or resource.25

Pardo said

in a statement made on March 20, 1969 that there was a
distinction between res communis and the common heritage of
23.

von Glahn, Law Among Nations, p. 315-327.
24. Milan Bulajic, Principles of International Development Law
Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 305.
25. Ibid., p. 305-306.
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mankind. He defined res commums as an area "usable for any
convenient purpose." He said that the resources in such an area
are indiscriminately and competitively exploitable. However,
he said the common heritage area had a "special status"
because it would be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes
and would be "administered by an international agency in the
name and for the benefit of all peoples and of present and
future generations. "26 Pardo observed that the existing
international law would allow powerful nations to claim the
deep seabed and its mineral resources in the same way that
the European nations had carved Africa into colonies in the
nineteenth

century.

Unfortunately the present juridical framework
clearly encourages, subject to certain limitations, the
appropriation for national purposes of the sea-bed
beyond the geophysical continental shelf. As I have
already had occasion to mention, the sea-bed and the
ocean floor are land. There are five generally recognized
modes of acquiring land in international law: cession,
subjugation, accretion, prescription ~nd occupation. 27

In this statement, Pardo criticized the international law
that allowed nations to acquire land. Cession is the "formal
transfer of title from one state to another.28 Subjugation is the
"firm military conquest" of a people and their territory.29
Roman law defined accretion as the gradual deposit of soil by a
26. Arvid Pardo, The Common Heritage: Selected Papers on Oceans and World Order
1967-1974 (Malta: Malta University Press, 1975), p. 67.
27. U.N. (Doc. A/C.l/PV. 1515), 1 November 1967.
28. von Glahn, Law Among Nations, p. 318.
29. Ibid., p. 638.
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river or ocean along the shore. The law gave the owner of the
river bank or shore the right to the newly accreted land.3 O
Prescription means that a "foreign state occupies a portion of
territory claimed by another state, encounters no protests by
the owner, and exercises rights of sovereignty. "31 Occupation is
a situation in which a nation takes over, occupies territory and
eventually owns the land.
Pardo urged that no one be allowed under old rules of
international law to own the seabed. He wanted to introduce a
concept in international law that promoted equality and social
welfare for poorer nations in current and future generations.3 2
This was a significant departure from international law
concerned with traditional security issues. Pardo's concept of
the common heritage was part of a larger trend in international
relations that would continue into the 1970s. Welfare issues
such as sharing resources emerged at this time because it was
possible to pay less attention to security issues. The East-West
detente gave nations a chance to shift focus toward issues such
as the ocean and the environment.3 3
To stress his belief in the need for new law and the
danger of inaction, Pardo said

that the United States had

already. begun leasing tracts of underwater land well beyond
30. Ibid., p. 316.
31. Ibid., p. 317.
32. For more information on the shift in international legal philosophy from
traditional security to human welfare concerns see Julius Stone, Visions of World
Order: Between State Power and Human Justice (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1984).
33. Donald J. Puchala and Stuart I. Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970s: the
Search for a Perspective," International Organization, vol. 28, no. 2 (1974): p. 2
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territorial waters. He warned that this trend would continue
unless an international body established a new legal regime to
protect the deep seabed from creeping national claims.
The process has already started and will lead to a
competitive scramble for sovereign rights over the land
underlying the world's seas and oceans, surpassing in
magnitude and in its implication last century's colonial
scramble for territory in Asia and Africa. The
consequences will be very grave: at the very least a
dramatic escalation of the arms race and sharply
increasing world tensions, caused also by the intolerable
injustice that would reserve the plurality of the world's
resources for the exclusive benefit of less than a handful
of nations. The strong will get stronger, the rich
richer and among the rich themselves there would arise
an increasing and insuperable differentiation between
two or three and the remainder. Between the very few
dominant Powers, suspicions and tensions would reach
unprecedented levels. Traditional activities of the high
seas would be curtailed.3 4
One weakness of Pardo's speech was that he cited only
one source - Mineral Resources of the Sea , by the American
engineer, John Mero,

when estimating the specific economic

advantages of seabed mining.
In his book Mr. Mero states that manganese
could be mined, transported to port and
processed at a cost of some $28.5 per ton, as compared to
gross commercial value of recoverable metal content
ranging from $40 to $100 per ton.35
~odules

34. U.N. (Doc. A/C.l/PV.1515), 1 Novemer 1967.
35. Ibid.
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The press release issued by the United Nations to
newspapers noted that Pardo's estimated $5 billion could be
raised by 1975 from seabed mining.36

This figure was Pardo's

extrapolation of Mero's estimates.This was a weak part of the
speech because the knowledge about the seabed and its
resources was in its infancy. Within a few years, Pardo's
predictions would seem ridiculously optimistic.
In the final section of his speech, Pardo delineated for the
first time the components of the common heritage concept as
applied to the deep seabed.

First, it was a concept that

provided for exploitation of a natural area to benefit all
mankind. Second, the area was to be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes. Third, the international community was to
have jurisdiction, but not sovereignty over the common
heritage of mankind area and resources. An agency that
represents the international community would act as a "trustee
for all countries over the oceans and the ocean floor to regulate,
supervise and control all activities on or · under the oceans and
the ocean floor," Pardo said.37

The concept would promote

of resources in the interests of mankind, with
exploitation
(
particular regard for the needs of poor countries and scientific
research to be conducted freely by all with the results shared
by all.

36. Sam Pope Brewer, "Malta Warns UN on Radioactive Pollution at Sea," New York
Times, 2 November 1967, p. 12.
37. U.N. (Doc. A/C.l/PV.1515), 1 November 1967.
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Nearly twenty years later, Christopher C. Joyner defined
the concept of the common heritage of mankind in nearly
identical fashion, a testament to the lasting power of Pardo's
original definition. Joyner described five principle elements to
the concept of the common heritage of mankind. They are that
(1) common space areas would legally be owned by no one, (2)
all people would be expected to share in the management of a
common space area, (3) economic benefits from natural
resources exploited from the common space would be shared
internationally, ( 4) use of the common space area would be
limited to peaceful purposes and (5) scientific research would
be conducted freely and openly and not threaten the
environment. The results should be "freely and publicly
exchanged in hopes of fostering greater scientific co-operation
and more extensive knowledge of the region. "38

The major

differences between the views of Pardo and Joyner was Pardo's
insistence that the common heritage of mankind be used
primarily for the poor of the world. Joyner gave no preference
to any social group, but he did reflect a greater awareness of
the need to protect the environment.
These differences can be attributed to the different
decades. The 1960s were a period when leaders talked about
social responsibility.

This was reflected in Pardo's desire to use

the fruits of the sea to raise the living standards of the poor m
developing countries. The late 1960s was a period of
38. Christopher C. Joyner, "Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common
Heritage of Mankind," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 35
(1986): p. 191-192.
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international idealism. In America, President Lyndon Johnson
had launched the War on Poverty and Martin Luther King Jr.
was leading a civil rights movement to raise the political,
economic and social possibilities for black people. Africans
were struggling in newly created countries to establish
governments and devise ways to feed, educate and employ
starving masses. Pardo's speech came at a time when the size
and character of the United Nations was also changing each
year. For example in 1966, the United Nations membership was
121 nations, almost three times the original founding
membership of 1945.39
At this time, America was engaged in a bloody and
controversial conflict in Vietnam, but President Johnson was
also concerned about promoting international peace whether it
was through international aid programs or ocean development
ideas. In 1966, Johnson urged Congress to approve $3 .3 billion
a year in aid for a new program he called Food For Freedom to
assist the nations - predominantly in Africa - where people
were starving.

40

That same year, Johnson gave his speech

identifying the ocean as a new arena for international
cooperation.
The 1960s were also a time when capitalism was
criticized by a number of world leaders. On March 28, 1967,
Pope Paul VI issued a papal encyclical entitled "On the
Development of Peoples" in which he urged "unselfish
39. Luman H. Long, ed., The World Almanac 1967 (New York: Newspaper Enterprise
Association, 1966), p. 678.
40. Ibid., p. 678.
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nonpolitical action for economic and social justice." He
condemned what he called the "evils of unrestrained
capitalism. "41 He said the right of property should be
subordinate to the common good.
This was the 1960s. The 1980s, on the other hand, were
not known for altruism on national or world levels. The global
economy had deteriorated. The economically powerful Asian
countries of Japan, Korea and Taiwan were beginning to
displace the western powers. National leaders like Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were preaching an antigovernment, pro-private enterprise philosophy. A philosophy
that was nearly the opposite of the international idealism of
the late 1960s common heritage concept. However, by the
1980s, the environment was firmly on the agenda of
international relations. It was recognized as linked to global
political stability.
Pardo's speech suggested that the international regime
should ( 1) oversee commercial mining 2} assure that the area
be used only for peaceful purposes and 3) be responsible for
curbing ocean pollution.

He stressed that international

management would promote peace and security: international
mining ·for oil, gas and other minerals would free the world
community of dependence on more politically sensitive land
sources. He also stressed this as a reason for the
technologically-advanced countries to favor an international
41. Robert C. Doty, "Pope Paul Calls for Urgent Steps to Aid Poor Lands," New York
Times, 29 March 1967, p. 1.
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regime. These countries depended on some of the lesser
developed countries in Africa and Latin America
materials such as oil and minerals.42

for raw

He claimed an

international regime for the deep sea could prevent
international conflict over valuable resources.
As will be seen, Pardo's background as an internationalist
influenced his decision to champion the principle of the
common heritage of mankind.

His position as ambassador from

Malta, a 122 square-mile nation in the Mediterranean, also
assisted him in the promotion of the idea.

Malta fell on neither

side of the North-South debate or of the Cold War division
between the Soviet bloc countries and the United States. This
gave Pardo credibility through neutrality.
The idea also was a way for Pardo to combine some of his
previous work at the United Nations on disarmament issues, UN
reorganization ideas and Third World development concerns.
Pardo joined the United Nations staff in September 1946, one
year after he was freed from a German concentration camp m
Berlin.

During the Second World War, he founded an

underground movement in Italy to aid the Allies. He was
imprisoned by the Mussolini government in 1940 and spent
two years in solitary confinement at the Regina Coeli prison in
Rome. In October, 1943, he was deported to Germany and put

42. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Report of the
Congressional Research Service on Deep Seabed Minerals: Resources, Diplomacy
and Strategic Interest, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 March 1978, p. 60.
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in the concentration camp at Grossbeeren and later moved to
the Alexander Platz prison in Berlin. 4 3
He served as acting chief of archives at the UN, worked
for the division of "Non-Self-Governing territories," was the
representative of the U.N. Development Program in Nigeria
from 1961-63 and Ecuador from 1963-64.

When Malta gained

its independence from the United Kingdom in 1964, the new
Maltese prime minister, Giorgio Borg Olivier, asked Pardo, a
personal friend, to serve as the nation's first ambassador to the
United Nations.44

A year before his famous speech in 1967,

Pardo introduced a resolution to control the trade of
weapons. 45

Pardo served as the Maltese ambassador until

1970 when a new government took over Malta.

He then

worked as a civil servant at the United Nations and later sought
a professorship in the United States. He was a professor of
international relations and senior research fellow at the
University of Southern California. He is currently retired m
Texas. Before his UN work, Pardo had received a degree m
history from the University of Tours and a doctorate in
international law from the University of Rome.
This background helps explain why Pardo's concept for
the deep seabed was his idea and not part of Malta's national
agenda.

"I had to be careful. The idea was never cleared with

the voters of Malta," Pardo said. "I was not eager to develop the

43. Pardo, Common Heritage, p. i.
44. Arvid Pardo, telephone interview with author, 2 December 1991.
45. Pardo, Common Heritage, p. v.
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full implications of the common heritage of mankind m an
explicit manner. " 46
Pardo chose to champion an international regime for the
deep seabed because he viewed this remote region of the world
as a safe place to shape a new form of international
cooperation. 47

He had no experience with mineral mining. He

was not an oceanographer although he had a layman's interest
in the technological advances that were opening up man's
knowledge of the deep ocean and demanding, in his opinion, an
international

management regime.

"I had nowhere else to go," said Pardo when he described
why he chose to suggest the common heritage of mankind
concept be applied to the deep seabed. "If I had said ocean
space, the matter never would have been accepted. The seabed
was the only place on earth that did not have the beginnings of
a legal structure. "4 8
Pardo elaborated on his idea of a new international
organization that he thought would work better than the
United Nations in his 197 i draft international ocean space
treaty.

His and other proposed treaties were presented to the

United Nations Sea-bed Committee, a body set up in 1968 by
the United Nations General Assembly to study the uses and
management of the seabed.49

He . wanted to give certain

46. Arvid Pardo, telephone interview with author, 2 December 1991.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Shigeru Oda, ed., The International Law of the Ocean Development
Sijthoff International Publishing Co., 1972), p. 148.

29

(Leyden:

privileges and rights to the countries most affected by the
marine environment.

To do this he suggested the seabed

regime have an assembly made up of representatives from
each nation. However, these members would be broken down
into three categories: coastal states with a population exceeding
90 million, all remaining coastal states and non-coastal states.
Decisions made by the assembly would be taken by an
affirmative vote of the majority and by a majority of members
belonging to two of these three sub-categories.5 o
Pardo thought the United Nations General Assembly
system was unwieldy

and believed a new system that gave

appropriate weight to nations with concerns about the marine
environment would be fairer and effective.

However, his

design was not that different from the United Nations General
Assembly where each nation has one vote. What was different
was that there was no Security Council, a body that gives veto
power to a select group of historically powerful nations.
Instead, power was distributed based on ·ocean reliance and
population.
Despite President Johnson's speech about the ocean and
other proposals to internationalize management of the deep
seabed,· the United States was caught off guard by Pardo's
common heritage concept.

Congress reacted unfavorably

beginning in the fall of 1967 when word spread about Malta's
August 17th note verbale suggesting a seabed regime.

50. Oda, International Law of the Ocean Development, p. 174-5

30

House

members introduced 22 resolutions specifically opposing
"vesting title to the ocean floor in the United Nations. "5 1
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee
on International Organizations reviewed the resolutions and
concluded that it would be premature and unwise to vest
jurisdiction over the seabed in a new international
organization. The subcommittee recommended the United
States actively discourage any action that might "prejudice
national interests in exploration, use and economic
exploitation "52

of the seabed. During a month of hearings on

the resolutions, the subcommittee heard from Ronald Reagan,
who was governor of California at the time, that he was
strongly against an international regime for the deep ocean.
President George Bush, a member of the House from Texas at
the time, also authored a resolution against vesting title to the
seabed in an international organization.53

Amid the flood of

opposition there was one resolution in favor of encouraging the
United Nations to develop a regime for the deep seabed that
would provide a source of ·revenue for poor nations and the

51. Quote~ from House Joint Resolution 816, 90th Cong., 1st sess. This resolution
and 21 similarly worded resolutions were the subject of hearings by the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations from
22 September to 31 October 1967. For testimony and descriptions of House Joint
Resolutions 816-824, 828-829, 834-837, 840, 843-844, 850, 856, 865, 876 and
916 see House Report No. 999, Interim Report on The United Nations and the Issue
of the Deep Ocean Resources, 90th Cong. 1st sess., 7 December 1967.
52. Ibid., p. 4R-5R.

53. See copy of telegram from Gov. Reagan to Rep. Dante B. Fascell of Florida,
chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, reprinted in House
Report No. 999, p. 33. For Rep. Bush-sponsored resolution see p. 77.
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United Nations. House Resolution 558 was sponsored by Rep.
Jonathan B. Bingham of New York.54
The infant American mineral extraction industry turned
to Congress in the late 1960s with concerns that Pardo had
proposed a socialistic international regime that would control
and thwart their efforts to begin deep seabed mining.5 5
Congress wanted to protect the mineral extraction industry's
rights of access to the seabed. Sen. Lee Metcalf, the chairman of
the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee,
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels, asked the
American Mining Congress to draft national legislation that
would protect seabed miners.5 6
However, within the Senate,

Sen. Claiborne Pell, a

Democrat from Rhode Island, embraced some of the
components of Pardo's idea. In the same month as the speech,
Pell sponsored two resolutions, one which favored an
international regime and the other which lay down a set of
"basic principles for governing the seabed" to be recommended
to the United Nations Gen.era! Assembly.57
Resolution 186 laid down

Pell's Senate

a "Declaration of Legal Principles

Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and
Exploitation of Ocean Space" which differed from Pardo's idea
because it trumpeted the age old concept of freedom of the
54. Ibid., p. 77.
55. Ann L. Rollick and Robert E. Osgood, New Era of Ocean Politics (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 22.
56. Ibid., p. 58.
57. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Governing
the Use of Ocean Space, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 29 November 1967.
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seas and did not suggest that be replaced.

"All states have the

right for their nationals to engage in fishing, aquaculture and
in-solution mining in the high seas beyond 12 miles from the
coast ... ," the Pell principles said.58

Unlike Pardo, Pell

recommended an appropriate authority designated by the
United Nations issue licenses to nations for the exploitation of
seabed .nonliving resources and living resources that are
"sedentary species." Pardo had suggested an independent
international regime have broad powers to manage the
resources of the deep sea. He wanted a separate government as
if this region of the ocean would be a new country.
Pell's suggestion arose from the American philosophy of
minimizing regulation. The primary goal of the proposal was to
allow for orderly and efficient exploitation of the seabed. It did
not aim to create a new source of money to feed the hungry or
promote development in the world's poorer nations. Pell
wanted to

ensure world order and protect international

security. However, he agreed with Pardo's· idea of decreeing the
seabed and subsoil be used for peaceful purposes and be
protected from environmental harm. Pell does not mention the
"common heritage of mankind," however his declaration states
that there is a "common interest of all mankind in the progress
of the exploration of ocean space and the exploitation of the
resources in ocean space for peaceful purposes. "59

The

principles encouraged international cooperation in science, but
58. Ibid, p. 4.
59. Ibid., p. 3.
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did not take the step that Pardo had taken of saying that
scientific information compiled by one country on the deep
seabed should · be the property of all countries.
Pell said that if the principles were followed, they would
give "the edge to those nations who now are most
technologically advanced and thus most able to take advantage
of the resources. "60

Pell and the Assistant Secretary of State,

Joseph Sisco, had difficulty with Pardo' s idea that lesser
developed countries should be given preferential treatment m
the use of resources from this new territory - the deep
seabed.6 1
Pardo had begun the process of changing international
marine policy by identifying and defining the concept of the
common heritage and how it should be applied to the deep
ocean seabed.

It was clear from the start and would become

clearer that he took a philosophical approach and not a
traditional legal approach. The idea and the approach might
have gone completely unnoticed in 1967 ·had not a number of
other forces helped to bring it to the fore.

Among those forces

were the discussions in the United States of a need to better
understand and use the oceans.

Like Pardo, key United States

policy-makers including President Johnson and Vice President
Hubert H. Humphrey 62

considered the ocean a vehicle for a

60. Ibid, p. 13.
61. Ibid., p. 21.
62. See letter from Humphrey to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on Ocean Space, Hearings on Activities of Nations in Ocean
91st Cong., 1st sess., 24, 25, 28 and 30 July 1969, p. 249.
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Space,

number of goals, not just improved use of ocean resources such
as fish or minerals. The president's science advisory
commission report Effective Use of the Sea

stressed the

ambitious idea that Americans should apply their know ledge
from land development to the ocean and should use the ocean
to foster international cooperation in both exploration and
exploitation. The report also stressed the security risks
presented by this massive unclaimed area. It encouraged the
United States to increase its presence in the ocean in order to
prevent future security threats. Sen. Pell also advocated that
the United States take a leadership role in the debate over how
the deep sea should be governed. He saw that other countries
were

getting involved in this debate and feared the United

States would lose ground if it did not jump into the fray with
positive proposals of its own.

35

Chapter II - The Advocates

The idea of the deep seabed as a common heritage of
mankind attracted a fervent following among a small group of
private citizens who formed fledgling nongovernmental
organizations. NGOs, as they are now called, were not new to
international politics, however, they were gaining importance
in the 1970s.1

The motivations of some of the NGOs that took

up the cause of the common heritage of mankind varied as did
the way each defined the concept.

As with Pardo and political

figures from the United States, each NGO leader brought a
different set of desires to the concept and tried to use the
common heritage of mankind as a vehicle to achieve his or her
goals.
Elizabeth Mann Borgese was a researcher at the Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara,
California in 1967 when she read about Arvid Pardo's United
Nations speech on the common heritage of mankind.

At the

time, she was reviving her interests in international relations
and Pardo's speech reminded her of work she had done with
her late husband, Guiseppe Borgese, on a World Constitution
published in the 1940s.

After the United Nation's speech,

Borgese invited the Maltese ambassador to visit the center, a
think tank headed by the renowned American educator, Robert
1. A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations, Principles and Issues (Englewood

Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977), p. 354.
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Maynard Hutchins.2

In the next decade, Borgese and Pardo

refined the concept of the common heritage of mankind
through their writings.
Much like Arvid Pardo, Borgese was a person without a
country. She came from a European intellectual family that was
uprooted by World War II; a family that lived in exile in the
United States and never could return to the intellectual and
cultural milieu obliterated by the war.

Borgese was the fifth of

six children born to the German writer Thomas Mann and his
wife Katia. She was born in Munich during the final days of
World War I and grew up in a household that was a center for
the literati of Europe. As the Nazis came to power in Germany,
her father moved away from his early nationalistic orientation
and began to criticize the Nazis.3

. His criticism eventually led

him and his family into exile first in Zurich, Switzerland in
1933 and later in the United States.
Borgese was influenced by her father's coterie of exiles
who dreamed of creating a world where fascism and Nazism
could not sprout anew. The dream infused her with a strong
desire at an early age to create some lasting improvement in
world governance.

At the age of 21, she married Guiseppe

Borgese, a man who was 56 years old at the time.

She had read

his book, Goliath: The March of Fascism, tracing the rise of
Italian fascism and decided he was the man she wanted to

2~ Elizabeth Mann Borgese, interview with author, Halifax, Canada, I November
1991.

3. Borgese,

correspondence with author, 12 February 1992.
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marry although she had never met him.

4

Borgese's deliberate

marriage to a husband much older than her in the face of
parental disapproval was early evidence of her strong will.
Also, her attachment to the abstract ideas that were a part of
Guiseppe Borgese's books

became a personal trademark that

would later be one of the reasons the idea of the "common
heritage of mankind" so intrigued her.
During the 1930s and early 1940s, the Borgeses worked
together at the University of Chicago where Guiseppe Borgese
was a professor of political science and international relations.
With the approval of University Chancellor Robert Maynard
Hutchins, Guiseppe Borgese brought together a group of
intellectuals to draft a proclamation warning of worldwide
danger to political freedom. The group, which included
Reinhold Niebuhr and Lewis Mumford, wrote and published a
book, entitled The City of Man, that described their hopes for a
just international order.

5

But the book had little impact. Lewis

Mumford later said of it: "Our book sold perhaps 8,000 to
10,000 copies, and at best reinforced the convictions of a
minute number of already awakened minds. "6 This criticism
could be applied to much of the work that Guiseppe Borgese
did. He. operated m an intellectual world cut off from both the

4. Borgese interview, 1 Nov. 1991. See also Giuseppe A. Borgese, Goliath: The March
of Fascism (NY: Viking Press, 1937).
5. Harry S. Ashmore, Unseasonable Truths: The Life of Robert Maynard Hutchins
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1989), p. 206. See also H. Agar, F. Aydelotte,
G~A. Borgese et al., The City of Man: A Declaration on World Democracy (New York:
The Viking Press, 1940).
6. Ashmore, Unseasonable Truths, p. 207.
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mainstream of American society and European society in which
he had grown up.
While these manifestos for creating a just society
grounded in international cooperation made little impact,
Elisabeth Borgese did not forget them. She became the carrier
of the hopes and ideas of both her father and husband when
both men died during the 1950s.
In 1964 Hutchins asked Borgese to be the first woman to
join the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. He
wanted her to resurrect the work she and her husband had
done in Chicago as founding members of the Committee to
Frame A World Constitution. The committee, founded in 1945,
had been influenced by the concerns Hutchins had about the
development of the atomic bomb, a project in which University
of Chicago scientists were playing key consulting roles. 7
Hutchins went so far as to urge Secretary of State, James F.
Byrnes, never to use the bomb. But his pleading did not stop
the test explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico during the
summer of 1945 or the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki m
August. Hutchins also took a dim view of the newly formed
United Nations. He believed it "was fated to join the League of
Nations· as another monument to postwar disillusionment."

8

This was the backdrop for a suggestion by Guiseppe Borgese
and Dean McKeon of the humanities division at the University

7. Ibid., p. 252.
8. Ibid., p. 262.
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of Chicago that they draft a world constitution. Guiseppe
Borgese said at the time:
"A world constitution is needed ... the deadline being the
day, unpredicted but not remote, when the atomic secret
will be in other hands. We do not think a world
constitution or a preliminary project will be drafted by
bureaucratic or diplomatic bodies. Their motions are
inhibited by statutory routines; their initiatives, even in
this most open-minded of nations, must stop at the
dogmatic wall of national sovereignty. 9
These words would be echoed by the work and thought
of Borgese's wife long after his death in 1952. She believed that
people outside the regular channels of government and
diplomacy had a significant role to play in articulating the
structure of a new international order. As idealist draftsmen,
people like herself would articulate ideas in the hope of moving
society forward. These beliefs underpinned the
nongovernmental organization that Elisabeth Borgese founded
in 1970, The International Ocean Institute, and the annual
conferences she has sponsored for 20 years called Pacem in
Maribus or Peace in the Oceans. The title of the organization
was a deliberate reference to Pope John XXIII Pacem in Terris
message. At these conferences, Borgese attempted to expand
the con's tituency for the oceans by involving scientists,
geographers, philosophers and political thinkers from around
the world in discussions of ocean issues.

Some of the people

that Borgese brought to these annual conferences included Alva
Myrdal, the Swedish cabinet minister and disarmament
9. Ibid., p. 262.
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activist; Jovan Djordjevic, a Yugoslav Constitutional lawyer and
one of the architects of the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution;
Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, the Ambassador of Ceylon to
the United Nations, the chairman of the United Nations Sea-bed
Committee and the man who presided over the United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference until his death in 1980; Lord Ritchie
Calder, a former professor of international relations at the
University of Edinburgh; and Norton Ginsburg, a professor of
geography at the University of Chicago. IO
As Elisabeth Borgese dusted off the World Constitution
written just after World War II, she realized the document was
just as idealistic and unrealistic as it had been in the 1945 .1

I

During that period, the constitution had been ripped apart by
the Chicago Tribune

and called a subversive document that

advocated the abolition of the United States as well as all other
countries. It was also criticized for challenging the American
belief in private property.

At the heart of the document was

the statement that four elements of life "earth, water, air and
energy are the common property of the human race." 12

This

idea did not spring newborn from the members of the
Committee to Frame a World Constitution. It was a restatement
of ancient beliefs expressed in Greek and Roman law that the
earth, the water and air belonged to . all people. I 3
10. E.M. Borgese, Pacem In M aribus (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1972), p. 323.
11. Borgese interview, 1 Nov. 1991.
12. G.A. Borgese, Foundations of the World Republic (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953), p. 305.
13. "By the law of nature these things are common to mankind - the air, running
water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea," according to Thomas C.
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When Borgese read about Pardo's speech on the common
heritage of mankind, it reminded her of the ideas she was
contemplating as secretary for the Committee to Frame a World
Constitution.

Only this time, in 1967, she said she believed that

the timing was right to apply the ideas to a real, political world.
Borgese recalled in a 1991 interview: " I told Hutchins that I
thought if we got involved with the Law of the Sea Conference,
we could try out our ideas and bring them down to the political
arena and make them less utopian. That is why I got into the
Law of the Sea." 14
Borgese shrewdly took advantage of the opportunity to
push for a new form of ocean regime at a time when ocean
affairs were relatively high on the international agenda and
also a fairly new field with no established cadre of intellectuals.
She carved room for herself in the newly forming arena. It was
a time in the development of the field of marine affairs that
people with general backgrounds and general concerns for the
ocean could become significant players. Prior to 1967, Borgese's
interests had not included the ocean, the seabed or mineral
mining. In 1975, Borgese wrote:
"The ocean is a laboratory for the development of new
and more rational methods of resource management...In
the post-industrial era, ocean space may well become the
fulcrum of a world economy, just as each semi-enclosed
or enclosed ocean basin will be much more than in the
past, the fulcrum of regional economic activities ... What
Sandars, ed., The lnslilules of Justinian (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1922), p.
90.
14. Borgese interview, 1 Nov. 1991.
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we are witnessing is a shift from a heartland-continentcentered world view to an ocean- centered world
view." 15
This kind of broad, sweeping statement was typical of
Borgese's writing.

Many of her books and articles discuss a

"Marine Revolution," that she compares to the industrial
revolution.

In the tone of a prophet she warns that this new

revolution caused by advances in ocean technology should not
proceed in the same way as the industrial revolution. Instead,
man should design technological advancements that benefit a
large portion of mankind and that do not leave damaged
natural resources in the wake.16

Borgese adopts this same

sweeping tone in other writings including, "The sea and the
dreams of man," an essay published in 1978 in which she looks
for the poetic essence of the ocean and links her own interests
in ocean management to her father's ideas about the sea .
... my father's love affair with the ocean must have
influenced me powerfully. Rereading his works in my
mature years, when I have myself become so deeply
involved with the oceans, I find his analysis of the human
relationship to nature, and especially the sea, the most
profound I have come across. He recognized man's awe in
face of the sea's infinity and wildness, in contrast to the
constraints of civilization, both equally necessary and
complementary; the sea as all and nothing, damnation
and redemption, longing and fear; the sea as the dark and

15. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, ed., The Tides of Change: Peace, Pollution and
Potential of the Oceans (New York: Mason/Charger, 1975), p. 342.
16. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, The Future of the Oceans: A Report to the Club of Rome
(Montreal: Harvest House, 1986), p. 13-42.
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wild element within the artist, within his characters and
himself. 17
Although much of her writing contained fanciful and
poetic ideas, Borgese also proposed some concrete ideas for
ocean management. Among them was the belief that the
common heritage regime could provide an "urgently needed"
system that was neither capitalism nor communism.18

She

said the philosophy of "non-ownership" as described by Pardo
was a key to this new system.19

Borgese also proposed that

an ocean development tax be assessed by an international body
on all fish caught, oil extracted and minerals produced from the
ocean beyond national jurisdiction. Although her idea was
proposed by the Canadian delegation in 1971 in the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed, it died
quickly .20
Borgese, as a senior research fellow, and Pardo, as a
visiting fellow, worked together at the Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions to define the

con~ept

of the common

heritage of mankind in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Under
their definition, the common heritage of mankind was a legal
and philosophical concept.21

It was to be applied to ocean

space, not just for seabed mining of manganese nodules, but
also for mining of oil and gas, cooperation in scientific
17. Jacques G. Richardson, ed., Managing the Ocean (Mt. Airy, MD: Lomond
Publications, 1985), p. 393.
18. Borgese, Future of the Oceans, p. 2.
19. Ibid., p. 132.
20. Ibid., p. 63-65. See also Canadian proposal of J.A. Beesley, In Elisabeth Mann
Borgese, ed., Pacem in Maribus, vol. 2 (Malta: International Ocean Institute, 1971).
21. Arvid Pardo, telephone interview with author, 2 December 1991.
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exploration and environmental protection of the seabed and
ocean waters above it.

Under the concept, an international

body would act as a trustee for mankind - present and future
generations - to manage the ocean space.
Together, Borgese and Pardo wrote The New
International Economic Order And the Law of the Sea.22 In this
1976 book they tried to tie the common heritage of mankind to
the popular movement for a New International Economic Order
led by Latin American and newly emerging African and Asian
nations.23

The goal of the NIEO was for Africa, Asia and Latin

America to move into positions of economic, political and
technological power. The exact manner in which this could be
done was vague.

Those who promoted the NIEO embraced the

common heritage of mankind as will be explained in greater
detail in chapter four. They supported the common heritage
idea because of the stated goal of sharing governance of a large
area of the ocean, sharing technology needed to explore and
mine the seabed and, finally, using profits made from selling
the minerals for Third World development.

In their book and

in subsequent writings, Pardo and Borgese called the common
heritage of mankind a broad and flexible concept.

They said

that the world was in a new era where "neither sovereignty

22.

Arvid Pardo and Elisabeth Mann Borgese, The New International Economic
o ·rder And The Law of the Sea (Malta: International Ocean Institute, 1976), p. 4.
23. United Nations, General Assembly, Res. 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974; U.N.
Gen. Ass., Res. 3201 and 3202 (S-VI) 1 May 1974.
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nor freedom (of the seas) are a suitable basis for a legal
regime. " 24
Borgese often alluded to this world between two
competing ideologies. For example, she believed ocean
management could forge a new path between socialism and
capitalism just as she believed it could establish a common
space regime that was neither sovereignty nor freedom of the
seas. The difficulty was figuring what is this in-between
regime. In this area, Borgese's sweeping approach frustrated
the practical-minded person.
However, Borgese encouraged Pardo to articulate more
clearly his idea and she also took on the role of publicizing
Pardo's idea. For example, she noted in a 1991 interview that
Pardo had deliberately used the word "heritage" instead of
"property" when he first spoke of a concept for managing the
ocean.

He would later explain that he did not use the word

"property" because he believed it carried implications of power
and privilege.25

Borgese's earlier work with the Committee to

Frame a World Constitution had promoted the idea of common
property.

But she said she preferred Pardo's idea that ocean

space would not be owned, but would be governed for current
and future generations. During the years that they worked
together, Borgese adopted many of Pardo's ideas and
influenced him by suggesting that the common heritage of

24.

Pardo and Borgese, The New International Economic Order, p.
25. Pardo interview, 2 Dec. 1991.
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4.

mankind concept should be a concept for other systems of
government on land and sea, she told Pardo.26
Over the decade from 1970 to 1980, Pardo's writing
became increasingly pessimistic about what was happening to
the common heritage concept. He began with optimism. In
t 968, a year after his United Nations speech, Pardo published

an article, "Who Will Control the Seabed?, "27

which strongly

advocated that the common heritage include three major
resources; hydrocarbons, calcareous ooze, which could be used
to manufacture cement, and manganese nodules.

He also

predicted that ocean technology was proceeding so quickly that
man would be able to live beneath the ocean in communities
within the century.

As with his speech, Pardo urged the

creation of an international regime to manage, govern, exploit
and explore the deep seabed. The article gave no specifics on
where Pardo wished the international deep seabed to begin.
One noticeable development in the article was that Pardo was
more vocal about the concerns of lesser · developed countries
than he had been in his 1967 speech.

He wrote that the deep

seabed should be mined for minerals in a way that did not
seriously injure the economies of nations that produced the
same minerals on land. Lesser developed countries were
concerned that a seabed source of . minerals would flood
markets and lower prices for their raw mineral exports.

26. Ibid.
27. Arvid Pardo, "Who Will Control the Seabed?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 47, no. 1
(1968): p. 124.
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Pardo's 1968 article was a rallying call for his suggested
United Nations resolution on the common heritage of mankind the Dec. 17, 1970 "Declaration of Principles Governing the SeaBed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the
· Limits of National Jurisdiction.28 The resolution declared the
common heritage was "an area of the sea-bed and the ocean
floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, the precise limits of which are yet to be
determined."

It included all but one of the five initial points

that Pardo made when he defined the common heritage regime
in his 1967 speech. The resources of the common heritage were
to be used for the benefit of all mankind, the deep seabed area
was to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the
international regime would have jurisdiction; but no person or
state would have sovereignty and the fruits of the deep seabed
would be used to assist the developing nations.
The resolution differed from Pardo's speech in that it
pushed for international cooperation in ·scientific research, but
did not stipulate that one nation's research in the deep seabed
should be shared with other nation as Pardo had proposed. The
resolution also advocated a "healthy development of the world
economy" that would "minimize any adverse economic effects
caused by

the fluctuation of prices of raw materials .. "

The

resolution also included stipulations pushed by the American
government and other maritime powers that nothing in the
common heritage concept would affect the "legal status of the
28. U.N., G.A.,

Res. 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970.
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waters superjacent to the area or that of the air space above
those waters." The exploration and exploitation of the resources
of the seabed would be governed by an "international regime
to be established."

Finally, the resolution called for the

convening of a conference on the Law of the Sea. To prepare for
such a conference, the United Nations created a Sea-bed
Committee in 1968 to design an international regime.
Before the Law of the Sea conference started in 1973,
Pardo sounded his disappointment with the Sea-Bed Committee
and his pessimism about the future of the common heritage. He
became disappointed in the early 1970s as he saw that lesser
developed countries were more interested in claiming large
economic zones that extended their ocean jurisdiction than they
were in setting up a large common heritage regime. As some of
these lesser developed countries campaigned for 200-mile
wide economic zones, they were advocating removal of the
most valuable seabed resources - oil and gas - from what Pardo
had hoped would be an international zone·. In an August 8,
1973 speech, Pardo said he was disgusted with developing
nation-sponsored proposals to expand coastal state sovereignty.
In a sarcastic manner, he noted that: "There would still exist
some marine plants, some floating seaweed, a few migratory
species of fish and sea mammals and some manganese nodules
outside the area under coastal State sovereignty of exclusive
jurisdiction. "29

He went on to predict that the hunger by

29 ·

Arvid Pardo, "A Statement on the Future Law of the Sea in Light of Current
Trends in Negotiations," Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 1, no. 4
(1974): p. 324.
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coastal states for larger and larger jurisdiction over the ocean
would result in a Law of the Sea conference slogan of "total
irresponsibility within total sovereignty for the common
benefit of mankind."
Like Borgese, Pardo believed that the advance of ocean
technology demanded a new legal concept for managing the
ocean. In his view the concept of freedom of the seas would no
longer work for the deep oceans; neither would the concept of
sovereignty in which the remaining ocean space was carved up
among nations. Instead, he called for a new way of thinking
without outlining in concrete terms what it should be.

"World

federalists and academicians might believe the answer lies m
the creation of a supranational authority for the oceans, to
which States would surrender their powers," Pardo noted, but
this was not "politically acceptable" nor "desirable." Instead, he
advocated a "flexible institutional framework within which
solutions can be sought to the increasingly serious problems
which are arising in ocean space." He wanted to constrain both
sovereignty and freedom and introduce a new element international cooperation.30 Pardo elaborated on the need for
cooperation and sharing of information and technology in on
July 26·, 1973 statement to the United Nations Social and
Economic Council. 31
By the time the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea began in late 1973, Borgese and Pardo were on the
30.

Ibid., p. 330.
31. Arvid Pardo, The Common Heritage: Selected Papers on Oceans and World
Order, 1967-1974 (Malta: Malta University Press, 1975), p. 305-310.
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periphery of the debate.

Pardo lost his ambassadorship in

1970 because of a change of government in Malta. Although he
was named an advisor to the assistant secretary general of the
United Nations, he felt powerless during the conference.32

His

writing during this period from 1973 to the end of the
conference in 1982 became increasingly bitter and pessimistic
culminating with an article outlining the failure of the
conference to give birth to a true and workable regime for the
common heritage of mankind.33
Borgese, on the other hand, remained an enthusiastic
advocate of the common heritage regime.
conference, she had formed the

By the start of the

International Ocean Institute,

a privately-funded nongovernmental organization that put on
international conferences, published papers on how the ocean
should be governed and later ran training programs m ocean
science and political issues for Third World leaders. She
participated in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea as a nongovernmental representative until 1974.
Frustrated with her position as a representative from an NGO,
Borgese sought official diplomatic status.

She wanted access to

the closed sessions where much of the conference work was
done. Borgese called on her international network of contacts to
gain a seat as a national representative.

Peter J ankowitsch of

the Austrian delegation offered her a position on the delegation
32.
33.

Pardo interview, 2 Dec. 1991.
Arvid Pardo, "An Opportunity Lost," In B. H. Oxman, D.D. Caron and C.O.
Buderi, eds., Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy Dilemma (San Francisco: Institute for
Contemporary Studies, 1983), pp. 13-26.
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of that nation.3 4

Using her status as a delegate, Borgese

criticized negotiators for narrowly concentrating on an
international regime for manganese-nodule mining. She urged
the conference to consider all seabed resources especially oil
and gas to be part of the common heritage.35

Despite

appointment as a delegate, Borgese was not regarded as a
powerful force at the conference. Policy-making was largely
out of her hands. 3 6
In addition to Borgese, a small group of Americans,
members of church and other NGOs, took up the Law of the Sea
as their cause.

Like Borgese, these champions of the common

heritage did not come from marine or scientific backgrounds.
They were idealists, social reformers and dreamers.
Sam and Miriam Levering had been advocates of what
they called "world order" since the end of World War II. They
heard about the United States Draft Proposal on the Law of the
Sea in 1972 and were urged by fellow Quakers to lobby for the
treaty within the United States government. · Said Miriam in a
1991 correspondence: "We ended up volunteering to do this
work, and stayed with it. We spent much time in Washington,
New York, Geneva; formed two organizations, one for lobbying
called The United States Committee for the Oceans and a year
later, the Ocean Education Project. "3 7

34. Borgese interview, 1 Nov. 1991.
35. Ibid.

36. Pardo interview, 2 Dec. 1991 and Marne Dubs, personal interview with author,
Narragansett, RI, 23 July 1991.
37. Miriam Levering, correspondence with author, 4 October 1991.

52

The Leverings joined with the United Methodist Women's
group to publish a newsletter called Neptune

during the

conference. Miriam said: "We were motivated by our religious
convictions that society at any level rests on the three Biblical
principles of law, justice and love. As communication has made
the world a community, it became clear that no community can
exist without some rules to prevent and settle conflict. Our
interest in the environmental aspects of the convention came
from a religious belief in the integrity of Creation."
The Leverings pushed for a large area of the ocean to be
considered the common heritage of mankind.

At the start of

the conference, there was discussion about including all the sea
floor beyond the three mile territorial sea in the common
heritage. But this idea quickly disappeared as coastal nations
latched onto the idea of creating 200-mile wide exclusive
economic zones off their coasts. The exclusive economic zone
was negotiated at the conference and allowed for each coastal
nation to declare the resources in a 200-mile band of ocean to
be theirs to manage and exploit.3 8
The Quaker United Nations staff m Geneva also
participated in the Law of the Sea discussions by offering
weekly ·panel discussions at the conference sessions in Geneva.
The discussions brought together delegates, scholars, scientists

38.

David J. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987). See also Francisco Vicuna, ed., The Exclusive Economic
Zone: A Latin American Perspective (Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1984).
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government officials and members of nongovernmental
organizations.3 9
Barbara Weaver, another citizen advocate of the common
heritage, was teaching social studies in a junior high school in
Ohio when she developed an interest in the Law of the Sea. She
took her class on a field trip to the United Nations in 197 4 and
the students met with diplomats about to depart for the
conference session in Caracas. Weaver was impressed by the
excitement of diplomats preparing for a conference that
brought together more nations of the world than had ever met.
When she returned to Ohio, she decided to get more involved
with the Law of the Sea and took an internship with the
Women's Division of the General Board of Global Ministries of
the United Methodist Church.
The Law of the Sea brought together a number of
Weaver's concerns - the ocean, social justice, peace and hunger
issues. In 1976, the Methodists founded a Law of the Sea
Project and hired Weaver to work full-time· on it in
Washington.

The Methodist Church became interested m the

issue because it fostered cooperation among nations in a
peaceful forum and because the church believed that ocean
wealth ·from mineral mining might finance a more just type of
development in the Third World. Weaver joined with the
Leverings to publish Neptune

during the various sessions of

the conference. The small NGOs also hosted speakers at forums
39. Lawrence Juda, ed., The Seventh Session of the Third United Nations Conference
on The Law of the Sea: Summary of Remarks of the Speakers, 11 April to 9 May
1978.
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to help build an awareness among delegates and interested
public of various issues discussed in treaty negotiations.
Weaver helped publish a 100-page handbook that was used to
explain the Law of the Sea issues to church groups in America's
heartland. 40
"I have always felt that the idea of the common heritage
is an important one," Weaver said in 1991. "Not only is there a
benefit to holding resources in common, but also the idea of
holding resources for the future was exciting.

But the

mechanics of figuring out how to do this ground people
down. "41
As advocates for the common heritage, Weaver and the
Leverings knew they were fighting a difficult battle. There was
strong tension between their idealism and the realism of the
American diplomats who reluctantly endorsed the idea of an
international regime for the deep seabed.
"I really thought the deep seabed was a small part of the
world. I really thought the industrialized · nations would let that
piece go to benefit the poorest of the poor nations," Weaver
said. "But they were concerned about precedent. In the end, I
think it was too radical an idea." Weaver left the Law of the Sea
Project in 1981. The Methodist Church closed the project in
1984.
40. Barbara Weaver, Lee Kimball, Miriam Levering, Arthur Paterson, James
Bridgman, Barbara Bachtell and Sister Mary Beth Reissen, Voyage to Discovery
(1977), an unpublished loose-leaf manual used to explain the Law of the Sea to
church and community groups.
41. Barbara Weaver, personal interview with author, New York City, 20 September
1991.
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"There was a brief window of possibility of real
cooperation," Weaver said. But that moment passed quickly.
Weaver places that moment in 1974 in Caracas. "That was
when people talked seriously about the common heritage of
mankind. Then the roadblocks got thrown up, awful fast," she
said.
John Logue waged his own campaign for the common
heritage of mankind, as director of Villanova University's
World Order Research Institute and as a member of the World
Federalists.

In 1980, Logue renamed the institute he directed,

the Common Heritage Institute. Like Borgese, with whom he
worked, Logue maintained that the idea of the common
heritage was larger than the oceans and should apply to other
natural resources in the future.

He argued that the ocean's

mineral wealth could provide a substantial financial base to
assist Third World development, alleviate world hunger, fund
ocean environmental protection and give the United Nations its
first independent source of income.

In newsletters, speeches

and the introduction to a book he edited, entitled,The Fate of
the Oceans, Logue said that the major problem with the United

Nations was its lack of a reliable source of revenue to do
international work.

Logue suggested that revenue from mining

oil and gas and seabed minerals should provide that source.
"Long ago, in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton said that
a person does not truly will an end or objective unless he also
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wills the means to accomplish that objective," wrote Logue in
Fate of the Oceans. 42
Throughout the nearly nine year Conference on the Law

of the Sea, Logue published a newsletter, the World Order
Research Institute Report, which detailed conference
happenings and promoted ideas he supported.

Like others on

the nongovernment side of the aisle, Logue was a maximalist.
To him, the common heritage was a philosophical concept

endorsing the benevolent management of ocean space by an
international regime for current and future generations. Logue
fought against the 200-mile exclusive economic zone,
maintaining that it took a sizeable chunk out of the most
valuable land and resources from the common heritage.

"The

200 mile EEZ means the death of the common heritage," Logue
wrote. 43

Logue was more interested in the original draft treaty

proposed by President Nixon in 1970 which would have
created an International Seabed Area beyond the 200-meterisobath.44

This area would have two parts·.

Ocean areas

between the 200 meter isobath and the edge of the continental
margin would be in the International Trusteeship Area. This
area would be managed by the coastal nation, which would
share r'e venues from resources with an international body. The

42. John Logue, ed., The Fate of the Oceans (Villanova: Villanova University Press,
1972), p. xvii.

43.

World Order Research Institute, World Order Research Institute Report (July
1975), pp. 1-4.

44. For copy of U.S. Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area see
appendix of Lawrence Juda, Ocean Space Rights: Developing U.S. Policy (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 205-249.
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deep sea beyond this zone would be completely managed by an
international ocean regime.
Logue promoted what was called the Barba Negra
Formula, named for a tall ship that he, other NG Os and
diplomats, sailed in New York harbor to promote the common
heritage concept. Similar to the Nixon proposal in concept, the
formula called for an even larger area where ocean wealth
would be shared between nations and the international
community.

It proposed the sharing of revenues from mineral

mining and oil production in the portion of ocean space from a
12-mile territorial sea to the end of the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone. Logue used his newsletter to promote this
formula and later to advocate a proposal by Nepal Ambassador
Shailendra K. Upadhyay to create a Common Heritage Fund
based on a similar revenue-sharing scheme.45
Logue also used his newsletter to prod Third World
leaders to take a strong role in promoting the common heritage.
"Unless the Third World takes a major responsibility for
reviving the common heritage of mankind there is every
reason to believe that the concept and the bright promise
inherent in it will die," Logue wrote as early as 1975.46
Ii is difficult to assess the effect these fledgling
nongovernmental organizations had on the development of the
common heritage of mankind concept. They promoted
45. World Order Research Institute, World Order Research Institute Report (March
1978), p. 1.

46.

World Order Research Institute, World Order Research Institute Report
(February 1975), p. I.
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discussion of the idea even when delegates were inclined to
ignore the concept or bog it down with technical disputes.
Borgese tried to broaden the constituency for the common
heritage concept by inviting international thinkers to annual
conferences. Although these conferences were sometimes
criticized as glorified international cocktail parties, they did
produce a body of writing that spread the philosophy and the
rhetoric of the common heritage. These conferences also
connected the ocean with other global issues such as
disarmament, population issues, pollution and hunger.4 7
The small membership of the NGOs did not seem to deter
them from sponsoring numerous forums and producing
volumes of written material during and after the conference.
Logue, Borgese and the Leverings each sponsored forums in
which diplomats, Third World leaders, scientists and
economists spoke on ocean issues.

They realized that the

common heritage idea had few strong spokesmen among the
United States delegation. Usually, their strongest allies were
among delegates from Africa and Asia. Logue and Borgese also
lamented that the delegates did not engage in much discussion
of what the common heritage of mankind would mean, leaving
this typ.e of discussion to NGO forums.48
One of the political weaknesse.s of common heritage
advocates was that they spoke for handfuls of like-minded
47 · Elisabeth Mann Borgese, ed., Pacem in Maribus (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.,
1972).
48. Borgese interview, 1 Nov. 1991. See also World Order Research Institute, World
Order Research Institute Report (October 1974), p. 1.
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people not large grass-root organizations. There was no
groundswell of support for the common heritage of mankind in
the American heartland. Borgese was a one-person-show m
many ways although she had an extensive network of
international scholars and diplomats to draw on for Pacem m
Maribus conferences. She was well-connected internationally
because of her work with Hutchins and her celebrity as the
daughter of an internationally known writer. Borgese also had
other international ties because she was a member of the Club
of Rome, an informal organization of scientists, educators,
economists and industrialists founded in 1968 to promote
global policy. 4 9
The common heritage advocates also lacked
nongovernmental counterparts from the lesser developed
countries in Africa, Latin America or Asia. The reason may be
that people in these countries did not have the money, time or
see the direct relevance to their lives of rallying for the
common heritage of mankind. The concept was abstract and it
was difficult for most people to make the connection between a
seabed regime and solving world problems of poverty, hunger
and underdevelopment. The people that rallied to this idea
were intellectuals, social justice activists and government
representatives from the Third World who could make the
abstract connection, had a deep belief in international
cooperation or saw an advantage to supporting the idea. But
49. See Donella Meadows, Dennis Meadows et al., The Limits of Growth: A Report for
the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe
Books, 1972).
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because the NGOs had no counterparts from the Third World,
they can be compared to abolitionists of the 19th century certain they knew what was right for a part of the world with
which they were not intimately familiar.

As with the

abolitionists, these "do-gooders" were not always understood or
respected even by the people they claimed to be supporting.
But the small band of NGOs did raise a strong voice for
internationalism and a global perspective at a conference
where nationalistic concerns dominated.50

At the close of the

Law of the Sea conference, Ambassador Tommy T. B. Koh of
Singapore, the conference president, thanked the Neptune
Group in particular for providing the conference with three
services - bringing independent sources of information on
technical issues, assisting representatives from developing
countries understand the new technology that prompted talk of
seabed mining and providing places for delegates to meet and
discuss ideas.5 1
The NGOs also began efforts to broaden the constituency
for the oceans.

Despite its mammoth size - covering more than

70 percent of the earth - the ocean, especially the area not
connected to the coast,

does not have a strong and large

constituency. The NGOs at the conference were the beginnings
of a citizen constituency for the ocean which has grown in the
1980s and 1990s with the help of charismatic international
50. J .N Barnes, "Non-governmental organizations: Increasing Global Perspective,"
Marine Policy, vol. 8 (1984): p. 171-81.
51. Manin I. Glassner, Neptune's Domain: A Political Geography of the Sea (Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 132.
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organizations such as Greenpeace and also mor·e specific causes
than a common heritage regime to rally around such as the
extinction of whales.5 2

52. Anthony D'Amato and Sudhir K. Chopra, "Whales: Their Emerging Right to
Life, "American Journal of International Law, vol. 85 (1991): p. 21-62.
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Chapter III - The Marriage of the New International
Economic Order and the Common Heritage of Mankind

While leaders of some NGOs were devoted advocates of
the concept of the common heritage of mankind, the most
powerful promoters of the common heritage at the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea were delegates from
the newly independent nations of the developing world. These
delegates from African, Asian and Latin American nations were
powerful for two reasons. They had the majority of votes
because there were more developing countries than
industrialized nations. They also had a moral argument; their
years of colonial subjugation allowed them to appeal to the
guilt of the industrialized world.

Unlike many of the

industrialized nations and some of the socialist countries that
reacted to Pardo's proposal with suspicion and reservation,
these nations embraced the concept and adopted it as a piece of
a larger movement called the New International Economic
Order.I
These national leaders defined the common heritage of
mankind so that it would fit with the broader New
International Economic Order goals of restructuring the
international economy.

The NIEO was announced and defined

in several United Nations resolutions including one passed on
L Lawrence Juda, ed., The Seventh Session of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea: Summary of Remarks of the Speakers, Quaker United Nations
Office Report, 11 April - 9 May 1978.
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Dec. 12' 1974 called the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties.2
A desire for a New International Economic Order was also
articulated at the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).

The growing number of developing nations

established this organization in 1964 because they wanted to
have more than a majority of the votes in the United Nations.
They desired some power over international trade.3
Forces favoring what became known as the NIEO had
been gaining momentum since the end of colonial rule in
Africa, Asia and Latin America.

By the late 1960s, these

countries had begun to challenge the classic economic system
that dominated the global economy.

The new nations believed

they had obtained political freedom, but were not economically
free of their colonial masters.

They saw the laissez-faire

economic system as promoting a form of neo-colonialism in
which Third World countries continued to supply the
developed world with raw materials, while being forced to pay
high prices for finished products.4

As these nations watched

their international debt grow, they saw the gap between the
wealthy, industrialized nations and their countries widening.
The goals of the New International Economic Order were
to restructure the economic system in the areas of trade,
2. U.N., G.A., Res. 3281 (XXIX) 12 December 1974. See also U.N., G.A., Res. 3201 (SVI) 1 May 1974.
3. P.N. Agarwala, The New International Economic Order: An Overview (New York:
Pergamon Press, 1983), pp. 112 and 167. See also Edwin Reubens, ed., The
Challenge of the New International Economic Order (Boulder: Westview Press,
1981).
4. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed., The New International Economic Order: The NorthSouth Debate (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977), p. 4.
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finance, technology transfers, and political relationships as a
way to close the wealth gap between developing countries and
the developed world. The Declaration of the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order notes that "the developing
countries, which constitute 70 percent of the world population,
account for only 30 percent of the world's income."5 The
developing countries believed the common heritage of mankind
could help them close the gap.
An international ocean regime for a vast portion of the
globe could be designed to give the lesser developed countries
a stronger role to play than they had in any other international
organization, including the United Nations which was formed
before these countries were born.

The mining of a new

resource could produce profits to assist development projects
in the Third World.

The common heritage of mankind also

offered a chance to create new international law .6

They

hoped it would be a "law of cooperation" among nations.7

They

wanted it to be a departure from existing international law
.

.

which these nations perceived as designed to protect private
interests working abroad and they wanted it to address human
welfare issues.8

5. U.N., G.A., Res. 3201.
6. Milan Bulajic, Principles of International Development Law (Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1986).
7· Boleslaw Adam Boczek, "Ideology and the Law of the Sea: The Challenge of the
New International Economic Order, Boston College International & Comparative Law
Review, vol. vii, no. 1 (1984): p. 5.
8. Lawrence Juda, "UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order," Ocean
Development and International Law Journal, vol. 7, no. 3-4, (1979): p. 223.
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Leaders of the newly emerging nations also recognized
that the common heritage concept was evolving, and that they
would have a chance to put their imprint on it.

Arvid Pardo

and Elizabeth Mann Borgese encouraged leaders of lesser
developed nations that the concept was well-suited to the New
International Economic Order .9
Scholars and leaders of developing countries defined the
common heritage as a new concept in international law, a
departure from all that had come before. This stand was bound
to make western nations that were more comfortable with
incremental change uneasy.

For example, Shigeru Oda, the

Japanese delegate to the United Nations Sea-bed Committee,
the body established by the United Nations in 1968 to study
ways to create a seabed regime, wanted to be sure that the
common heritage concept did not supplant the age-old
international legal concept of freedom of the high seas.Io In a
statement on March 25, 1969 in the Sea-bed Committee, Oda
said: "To ignore that principle will inevitably result in chaos
and thus inhibit the optimum use of the seabed for the benefit
of all mankind." 11
9. Elisabe_th Mann Borgese, "The New International Economic Order and · the Law of
the Sea," San Diego Law Review, vol. 14, no. 3 (1977): p. 548. See also Arvid Pardo,
"Building the New International Order: The Need for a Framework Treaty," In A.
Dolman, ed., Global Planning and Resource Management (New York: Pergamon Press,
1980) pp. 195-201.
10. Under the principle of freedom of the seas no state may subject any part of the
high seas to its sovereignty. This principle was customary law in the 18th century
and became part of treaty law in Article I of the 1958 United Nations Conference
the Law of the Sea, Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312.
11. Shigeru Oda, ed., The Law of the Sea in our Time: The United Nations Sea-bed
Committee, 1968-1973 (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1977), p. 57.
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To the developing countries, the principle of freedom of
the seas was part of the old order. It was an ocean law
equivalent of laissez-faire economics that allowed the powerful
to take a larger share of fish, oil and other ocean resources than
that taken by the lesser developed nations. It did nothing to
ensure equal access to natural resources. The debate became
whether the principle of freedom of the seas would be replaced
by the emerging principle of the common heritage in the deep
seabed or whether the two could exist at once.
The developing country definition of the common
heritage of mankind differed from Pardo's original definition in
considering the deep seabed a type of "common property" that
would by owned by "mankind."

Christopher Pinto of Sri Lanka

explained to participants at a 1978 Law of the Sea Workshop at
the University of Hawaii that the common heritage of mankind
"... means that those minerals cannot be freely mined.
They are not there, so to speak, for the taking." I 2

The idea that the seabed 1s the exclusive property of
Mankind is expressed in the Moratorium Resolution passed m
1969 by the United Nations General Assembly prohibiting
exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed by any nation

12. Said Mahmoudi, The Law of Deep Sea-Bed Mining (Stockholm: Almqvist &
Wiksell International, 1987), p. 159. See also Christopher Pinto, "Toward a Regime
Governing International Public Property," In A. Dolman, ed., Global Planning and
Resource Management (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 202-224.
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pending the establishment of an international regime.13

The

resolution was passed over the objections of a number of
developed countries including the United States, Canada, the
United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. It states that
"pending the establishment of the aforementioned international
regime: a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound
to refrain from all activities of exploitation of the resources of
the area of the sea-bed ... beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction." 14
A representative from the United States to the United
Nations called the resolution counterproductive, unnecessary
and charged that it was ludicrous for the Third World to
believe a great seabed land grab was about to happen. The U.S.
also said such a moratorium resolution set a discouraging tone
for commercial development of mining technology at a time
when private industry needed encouragement. The United
States accused promoters of the resolution with trying to slow
seabed exploration and exploitation technology and claimed
that such a resolution encouraged nations to make
"unjustifiably expansive" ocean space claims in order to remove
more territory from a future international regime. I 5
The moratorium was promoted by Garcia Robles, the
representative from Mexico to the United Nations, who called it

13. U.N., G.A., Res. 2574D (XXIV) 15 December 1969. Reprinted in Shigeru Oda,
ed., The International Law of the Ocean Development: Basic Documents (Leyden:
Sijthoff, 1972), p. 43.
14. Ibid.
15. U.N., G.A. (A/PV.1833), 15 December 1969.
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simply a repetition of what had already been stated in
previous resolutions. Robles said the moratorium was needed
to protect the seabed from people taking advantage of the legal
vacuum until the regime was developed. Araujo Castro, the
United Nation delegate from Brazil, also said it was logical to
postpone any seabed activities.16 The resolution was adopted
by a vote of 62 to 28, with 28 abstentions.
Developing countries trumpeted the common heritage of
mankind regime while they also took up the cause of extending
national jurisdiction in the ocean. By supporting both a highly
international concept and a nationalistic concept of extending
jurisdiction, the developing countries were ideologically
conflicted.17

What they truly wanted was to control more of

the world's resources and they looked for the most expedient
ways to achieve this control.
By promoting 200-mile-wide exclusive economic zones,
some of the coastal Latin American and African delegates to
the conference differed markedly from Pard·o and NGO
advocates of the common heritage. This zone would be claimed
by the coastal state for exclusive fishing, mining and other
resource use. The idea had emerged from Africa and Latin
America. In June 1972, the African States Regional Se~inar on
the Law of the Sea in Yaounde endorsed a 200-mile economic
zone.18

During the same month, a group of Latin American

16. Ibid.
17. Boczek,

Ideology and the Law of the Sea.
18. Reprinted in U.N., G.A., Official Records, Supplement
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21, (A/8721), 1972,

p.

nations issued the Declaration of Santo Domingo which called
for a patrimonial sea to give states sovereign rights over a
large new ocean territory yet to be demarcated.1 9
The idea of the exclusive economic zone conflicted with
Pardo's hopes that nations would move beyond sovereignty as
a primary goal and create a large common heritage area with
oil and mineral resources. However, the zone fulfilled one of
the stated New International Economic Order goals of
nationalizing natural resources. By pushing for nationalized
ocean space, the lesser developed countries with coastlines
would be securing these resources for themselves at a time
when entrepreneurs from developed countries wanted to drill
for oil or fish off the coasts of countries with abundant
resources. The Latin American nations led by Peru, Chile and
Brazil were the strongest proponents of expanding a nation's
ocean claims. But many African coastal states also saw this as a
positive move. The lesser developed countries without coasts
and with limited or no continental shelves did not favor
extending ocean jurisdiction.20

However, these nations joined

with other developing countries to support the idea of
extending jurisdiction because they did not want to side with
developed countries that opposed the ocean enclosure
movement. 21

19. Ibid. p. 73.
20. R.P. Anand, Legal Regime of The Sea-Bed And The Developing Countries
Thomson Press Ltd., 1975), p. 159.
21. Boczek, Ideology and the Law of the Sea, p. 13-15.
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(Delhi:

Boleslaw Boczek has concluded that the "rhetoric of the
NIEO" was used to mask pure and simple "nationalism."

By

promoting the exclusive economic zone, these nations were
urging the removal of one third of ocean space from what
would be the common heritage of mankind. In addition, that
third of ocean space contained most of the valuable oil and gas
deposits and nearly 80 percent of the fish stocks. In the end,
the adoption of the exclusive economic zone benefited
developed countries more than its Third World promoters.
Twenty five countries control 76 percent of the world exclusive
economic zone. 22

The United States and France lead the world

in square miles of exclusive economic zone.23
The primary conflict between the NIEO and the common
heritage of mankind regime for the ocean was economic.

Some

of the founders of the NIEO were representatives of African
and Latin American nations that had mineral mines within
their land borders. When they talked about nationalizing
natural resources they were speaking primarily about
controlling these mines and the wealth that came from them.
They also talked about forming cartels in order to gain more
economic power in international trade.24 They looked to the
Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' embargo
22.
23.

Ibid., p. 14.
Lewis Alexander, Navigational Restrictions Within the New LOS Context:
Geographical Implications for the United States (Peacedale, RI: Offshore
Consultants Inc., 1986), p. 88.
24. Kenneth E. Boulder, "Cartels, Prices, and the Grants Economy," In Edwin
Reubens, ed., The Challenge of the New International Economic Order (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1981).
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as a role model for building an economic power base and
controlling prices. The problem was how could these nations
support an international regime devoted to increasing
exploitation of minerals from the seabed. It was obvious that
these minerals would compete on the world market with the
minerals mined within some of the developing countries. The
competition might depress prices or even shift the mining
business permanently from land to sea.25
How could the developing countries resolve the major
conflicts between devotion to a common heritage regime for
mining the seabed and a desire to limit or, at least, control the
supply and prices of a new source of minerals on the world
market? How could these nations resolve their desire to
promote a new form of internationalism and at the same time
grab as much ocean space as was possible for their particular
nations? These conflicts would become more apparent during
the ten years of negotiations on a Law of the Sea Treaty. They
would be accommodated in the treaty. But the accommodation
would add a level of complexity to the treaty which would
make parts of it completely impractical.

25.

United Nations, Report by the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on
T.r ade and Development, Implications of the Exploitation of the Mineral Resources
of the International Area of the Sea-Bed: Issues of International Commodity Policy,
(TD/B/C. l/170), 8 January 1975.
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Chapter IV - The Concept is Translated into Policy

The intellectual idea of applying the common heritage
concept to the world's oceans moved into the policy arena at
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) in 1973.

As with any intellectual concept, the

journey transformed the lofty idea into a much different
practical policy. A whole new set of people dominated the
policy-making arena than had been part of the idea arena.
Although some of the idea people, including Borgese and Pardo,
continued to write, participate in discussions and closely
observe UNCLOS, they had little effect on the treaty-making
process.
This chapter describes the aspirations of developing
nations for a common heritage policy and the aspirations of the
United States, the leading developed nation and originally one
of the strongest proponents of a Law of the Sea Conference, for
a seabed mining regime. The developing nations and the United
States were caught in a stru.ggle over translating the idea into a
workable mining regime. Some of the key points in this
struggle included a 1976 compromise put forward by Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger; the work of Elliot Richardson,
President Jimmy Carter's negotiator at UNCLOS;

the role of the

American Congress in influencing the international agreement
and President Reagan's 1982 decision to reject the seabed
regime. This chapter will review the current status of the
seabed portion of the treaty, the preparatory commission
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meetings and current and future economic viability of seabed
mining.
The geographic limitations of the common heritage
regime were defined quickly at UNCLOS. Borgese had suggested
an international ocean regime that governed ocean space - the
waters and the seabed -

beyond the territorial sea, but

negotiations limited the common heritage to the deep seabed
and subsoil. The waters above would continue to be governed
by the concept of freedom of the high seas. Early in the
conference, nations demanded a 200-mile exclusive economic
zone and coastal state rights to exploit the living and nonliving
resources of this band of ocean space as well as the continental
shelf beyond 200 miles.I

When nations agreed to this, they

eliminated the chance that offshore oil - found predominantly
beneath the continental shelf

- would be part of the common

heritage. Pardo lamented the loss of this valuable resource to
the world community and warned that it stripped the common
heritage of its value and doomed the regime to insignificance.2
By the start of UNCLOS, the world's nations had agreed
that the deep seabed and its resources were the common
heritage of mankind, a shared resource. This step was
accomplished in the 1970 Declaration of Principles passed as a

1. Bernard H. Oxman, "Summary of the Law of the Sea Convention," In Oxman, D.
Caron and C. Buderi, eds., Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy Dilemma (San Francisco:
I~stitute for Contemporary Studies, 1983), p. 153.
2. Arvid Pardo, The Common Heritage: Selected Papers on Oceans and World Order
1967-1974 (Malta: Malta University Press, 1975), p. xii.
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United Nations General Assembly resolution.3 But it was a
much more difficult step for nations with highly different
economic systems and political ideologies to design an
international economic organization to oversee the extraction of
minerals from the seabed and the division of revenues.
The United Nations conference, a body of more than
3,000 delegates from 159 nations, the largest legislative forum
ever convened, assigned the duty of drafting a seabed regime
to Committee One.

Committee Two worked on issues of

national jurisdiction, economic zones, territorial sea, straits and
continental shelves, while Committee Three addressed marine
pollution, scientific research issues and technology transfer.
The Law of the Sea convention attempted to tackle all the
significant ocean issues that had emerged to write a
"constitution for the oceans. "4
The conference was held primarily because the United
States and other maritime powers were concerned with
"creeping jurisdiction," the phrase used to describe a trend m
which coastal states push their jurisdiction seawards, causing
navigational and overflight barriers to maritime powers.

The

United States began pushing for a Law of the Sea conference in
the late 1960s.5

In addition, the developed countries wanted

to address concerns about dwindling fisheries, the marine
environment, and oil exploration. Initially, American policy3. U.N., G.A., Res. 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970.
4~ William Wertenbaker, "A Reporter at Large: The Law of the Sea," New Yorker
(Aug. 1, 1983): p. 39.
5· Elliot Richardson, telephone interview with author, 7 May 1992.
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makers believed separate treaties on these diverse issues
would be the best approach. However, they realized these
narrowly-focused treaties would not interest and therefore
discourage participation by a large number of the new,
predominantly Third World nations. So they considered adding
issues that interested the new nations, including the common
heritage regime for seabed mining and revenues from it. In
1969, the United Nations announced the conference would take
up a broad array of issues and aim for a "package deal."
By the start of the conference,

6

delegations of a number

of developing countries that served on the UN Sea-bed
Committee had drafted proposals for a seabed regime. These
proposals reflected a desire for mineral price supports,
transfers of technology from the industrialized countries to the
developing nations, aid from developed countries to build
oceanographic institutions, processing plants in developing
countries and hiring preferences for people from developing
countries.

The Tanzanian draft, submitted · to the Sea-bed

Committee on March 24, 1971, suggested the treaty provide for
"equitable sharing by States ... taking into particular
consideration the interests and needs of developing countries,
whether landlocked or coastal. "7

The second aim was that the

authority would minimize fluctuations of prices of land
minerals and raw materials taken from the seabed.
6. Elliot Richardson, "Law of the
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 1,
7. Text of Tanzanian Draft can be
of the Ocean Development: Basic

Tanzania

Sea: A Reassessment of U.S. Interests,"
no. 2 (1990): p. 9.
found in Shigeru Oda, ed., The International Law
Documents (Leyden; Sijthoff, 1972), p. 114.
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also wanted an International Seabed Authority to be
empowered to explore and exploit the resources itself.

The

seabed authority would be in charge of mining and would
oversee any subcontracting of the mining to private or national
companies. 8 Tanzania also stressed that there should be formal
exchanges of scientific and technical information as well as
exchanges of scientists to assist with training.
Tanzania suggested the governance of the seabed be left
to an assembly and council. The assembly would include every
nation that was party to the treaty and each nation would have
one vote; the council would consist of 18 members elected by
the assembly, not less than three delegates from landlocked
states. The representatives must be from different areas of the
world to assure a geographic distribution. The council could be
controlled by the lesser developed countries because they
would control the assembly which elected the council.
Fourteen Latin American nations also submitted a
proposal to the Sea-bed Committee in the summer of 197 I.9
Like the Tanzanian proposal, it emphasized that the seabed
should be exploited in a manner that minimized any fluctuation
of prices for land-produced mineral exports.

More specifically,

it said · the International Seabed Authority would have the
power to control, reduce, suspend production or "fix" prices of
minerals mined from the seabed. The Latin American proposal
gave broad powers to the International Seabed Authority to
8~ Ibid., p. 117.
9. Text of Latin American Draft can be found in Oda, ed., The International Law of
Ocean Development: Basic Documents, p. 143.
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supervise all stages of scientific research in the common
heritage area. The ISA would ensure "the participation of
developing countries on terms of equality with developed
countries in all aspects of the activities carried out in the
area." 1o

Among these broad powers was the right of the

authority to favor developing countries when siting processing
plants and to "adopt appropriate measures to ensure the
employment of qualified personnel from developing countries
in all aspects of the activities carried out in the area."

These

were the affirmative action stipulations.
Some developing countries feared seabed mining would
create a bonanza of minerals that might depress prices of their
mineral exports. These fears, which proved unrealistic because
seabed mining never developed, were based on the original
estimated total volume of manganese nodules - some 1.5
trillion tons. However, the figure ignored market forces that
would control production and the high cost of obtaining even a
small fraction of these seabed minerals. I 1 ·
The initial U.S. plan, called the Nixon proposal, for a
seabed regime began with the statement that the seabed
should be considered the common heritage of mankind.12
Article · 5 of the proposal stated that an International Seabed
Authority shall use revenues from exploration and exploitation
of the mineral resources "for the benefit all mankind,
particularly to promote the economic advancement of
10. Ibid., p. 144.
11. Richardson, Law of the Sea, p. 5.
12. Text of U.S. Proposal can be found in Juda, Ocean Space Rights, p. 205.
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developing States Parties to this Convention .. " 13

In this sense,

Americans accepted the concept of the common heritage and
Pardo's priorities without changes. According to Markus
Schmidt,

Elliot Richardson, the Under Secretary of State for

President Richard M. Nixon, and David Packard, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, designed the American draft.14

During

the 1970s, Richardson took other positions in the Nixon
Administration, including Attorney General. He returned to the
Law of the Sea process in 1977 as an appointee of another
president, Jimmy Carter.
The American proposal

submitted to the UN Sea-bed

Committee in 1970 was explicit on geography and specific on
economic and business concerns.

The International Seabed

Area was to begin just beyond the depth of 200 meters in the
ocean. If the 200-meter isobath was on the continental shelf,
there would be a new area called the trusteeship zone between
the 200-meter isobath and the end of the continental margm.
The coastal state would manage the trusteeship zone, but
would hold the zone in trust for the international community
and would share revenues from resources with the
international community. The international community would
manage and reap the benefits of seabed resources beyond the
trusteeship zone. The draft

proposed an assembly, council and

tribunal to govern the international seabed area. The council
would have representatives of six of the most industrially13. Ibid.
14. Markus Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), p. 26.
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advanced nations that were engaged in seabed mining. The
proposed council would also include 18 additional
representatives, 12 would be from developing countries and at
least two must represent land-locked or shelf-locked nations.15
The council was to draw up budgets and submit these for
approval to the assembly. A tribunal would be created to
resolve disputes, including disagreements over claims to ocean
mining sites.
The proposed treaty included protection for mining
companies that had already begun exploration and exploitation
when the treaty was enacted. This was a concern of the newly
developing American mineral-mining industry.16

The treaty

called for payments to the International Seabed Authority to
be based on production and for there to be a rental fee for the
seabed mining sites. This was similar to the American system
of leasing outer continental shelf lands for oil and gas
exploitation. The sites would be awarded to various exploiters
using cash bonus bids, another similarity to the American oil
and gas leasing program run by the Interior Department.

The

proposal, with its division of responsibilities for the trusteeship
zones and the international seabed area, had familiar themes of
balance· of power found in the United States Constitution. In
this case, the draft treaty was balancing the rights of the
15. These are the countries that because of their geography have no access to a
continental shelf and therefore the resources of these rich oceanic areas.
l~. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Report of
Congressional Research Service on Deep Seabed Minerals: Resources, Diplomacy
and Strategic Interest, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 March 1978, p. 87.

80

international government which was analogous to the federal
government with the rights of the various coastal national
governments which were analogous to the state governments.
The national governments would have a version of "state's
rights" in the trusteeship zone. They would be able to set up
their own leasing policies and their own revenue garnering
methods. However, they would have to donate some revenue to
the larger international authority. The U.S. viewed the
International Seabed Authority as a license board what would
issue permits for various nations or private companies to
explore and exploit the seabed, but not as a supranational
institution that did the mining itself.
Comparing the proposals from the United States and the
developing nations makes it easy to see what became the
crucial disagreements in Committee I.

Those disagreements

were over whether the Seabed Authority should be a licensing
body or a powerful international body that also ran seabed
mining.

Other disagreements centered on mandatory

technology transfer, an idea American policy-makers found
abhorrent, voting and representation in the assembly and
council and payments to the International Seabed Authority.
Yet, after nine years of negotiations, a draft was devised.

It

reflected a statement made early in the treaty process by the
American negotiator, Leigh Ratiner, who called for a detailed
mining regime.17

Ratiner pushed for detail on seabed mining

because he feared that broad generalizations would be open to
17. U.N.,

L.O.S.,

(Doc. A/CONF. 62/Cl/L6), 13 August 1974.
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interpretations favoring the developing countries that would
have majority control of an assembly. The level of detail in the
mining regime was overwhelming.
Negotiations moved slower in the Committee I than in
any of the other two committees at UNCLOS for a number of
reasons. The ideological split between developing countries and
developed countries was the firmest in this committee. In the
other two committees, the North-South split often fell apart
when countries formed unusual alliances based on other issues
such as geography .18

The seabed committee was also trying to

design the world's first economic joint venture that would be
run by an international organization. And seabed mining did
not have the emotional immediacy that controlling existing
pollution in the ocean had or that determining where
fishermen could throw their nets has had throughout history. It
was also not a top priority for the United States.
Another factor that slowed negotiations was declining
interest in seabed minerals which occurred · as the decade
progressed and many people concluded they were not the
treasure at the end of the rainbow.

19

In the course of the

decade, scientists scaled back their initial estimates of the
amount of seabed minerals.

In addition, the fear of shortages

of key minerals abated. The world also witnessed a rapid
transformation of industry from one that was heavily
18. Bernard H. Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
the 1976 New York Sessions," American Journal of International Law, vol. 71, no. 2
(1977): p. 251.
19. Mame Dubs, personal interview with author, Narragansett, RI, 23 July 1991.
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dependent on metals for machinery to one that depended more
on information and soft computer technology.20
By the mid-1970s, the developed nations and what is
called the Group of 77, the name given to developing nations
that banded together to work as a voting group at international
negotiations, were deadlocked over a seabed mining regime.
The United States suggested a compromise in 1976 in an
attempt to break the deadlock.

On April 8, 1976, Secretary of

State Henry Kissinger proposed what became known as the
"parallel system."

He suggested that the seabed regime have

both American-style private-industry seabed mining and
mining by the "Enterprise," the mining operation controlled by
the International Seabed Authority .21
The compromise was a major concession for the United
States; it

was criticized by the American hard minerals

industry and frowned upon by some members of Congress. By
the mid-1970s, Congress had been working for nearly half a
decade on national seabed mining legislation.22

Suspicious of

the international negotiations on the common heritage concept,
the small, but articulate leaders of the American hard minerals
20. John _Padan, "Commercial Recovery of Deep Seabed Manganese Nodules: Twenty
Years of Accomplishments," Marine Mining, vol. 9 (1990): p. 87-103.
21. Ann Rollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, p. 316. Schmidt,
Common Heritage or Common Burden?, p. 124; See also Senate Report No. 96-307,
Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act, 96th Cong., 1st sess., p. 86-88.
22. See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels, Mineral Resources of the
Deep Seabed, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 17 May 1973; and House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on
International Organizations, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 96th
Cong., 1st sess., 11 July 1979.

83

industry had turned to Congress for support. The industry
which consisted of less than a dozen companies and
consortiums that had done preliminary research since the early
t 960s on deep seabed mining, promoted what it called interim

national legislation.23

Legislative supporters said they wanted

Congress to adopt this legislation to encourage mining research
and development to continue until an international treaty was
completed to supersede the law.
The main reasons spokesmen for this small industry gave
for interim legislation was that a treaty would take too long
and American companies needed legal security to make multimillion dollar investments in mining research and exploration.
The U.S. companies stressed that they needed long lead times
before any actual mining could take place.

And they wanted to

hold onto the technological advantage they had over other
countries in this new field.
In addition, the U.S. companies used Congress to express
their specific desires for what an international regime should
contain. They were skeptical of the common heritage concept
and wanted the national law to stress that deep seabed mining
could be done under the old concept of freedom of the high
seas. T·he law that passed Congress in 1980, the Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act,

states: "It is the legal opinion of

the United States that exploration for and commercial recovery
of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of
the high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the
23.

Juda, Ocean Space Rights, pp.

130-135.
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interests of other states in their exercise of those other
freedoms recognized by general principles of international
law." 24

The legislation had to trumpet freedom of the seas

because it is the legal doctrine that allows one nation to take
resources from an unowned area of the sea.
The law does not endorse the concept of the common
heritage. Instead, it pays symbolic homage or lip service to the
phrase and advocates a number of principles that are inimical
to the concept as was defined by Pardo. The law states that the
United States support of the 1970 United Nations Declaration of
Principles was not an acceptance of the common heritage
concept. Instead, the United States supported the resolution
with the understanding that the concept would be clearly
defined in a treaty. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Act states that the United States is not bound by the 1970
principles because no treaty had defined the common heritage
to the satisfaction of the United States.25
It took the mining industry and the small group of
Congressional supporters nine years to see a law passed. The
law that was passed was quite different from the original
industry proposal which would have guaranteed the federal
government bail out any private company that lost money
because of changes in the regime due to an international treaty.
Presidents Nixon and Ford opposed a national seabed mining
law primarily because they wanted to give UNCLOS a chance to
24. U.S. Code, Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Public Law 96-283, 28
June 1980.
25. Ibid., Title I, Sec. 2, no. 7.
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devise an international treaty. However, President Carter
initially opposed the law, but decided in 1978 to endorse it.2 6
President Carter and Elliot Richardson, Carter's ambassador-atlarge and special representative for the Law of the Sea,
endorsed the legislation with the hope that it would put
pressure on the international treaty negotiations to bring them
to a close. Carter and Richardson endorsed national legislation
at a point in the UNCLOS negotiations when the United States
had achieved its primary goals of addressing navigational and
environmental concerns. Richardson said in 1992: "I did not
believe the seabed bill was worth a damn then and I do not
believe it now. We thought at the time its passage would
strengthen our bargaining position."27
However, the developing countries that had formed an
organization called the Group of 77 strongly objected to
American legislation and its stipulation that other mining
nations could join a reciprocating agreement to form a

small,

select treaty agreement outside UNCLOS to · divide up portions
of the seabed.28 Satya Nandan, a spokesman for the Group of

77, submitted a statement to Congress strongly opposing the
bill and claiming it violated The Declaration for a Moratorium
on Seabed Exploration and Exploitation, the 1969 resolution
passed by the United Nations General Assembly which placed a

26. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden?, p. 87.
27. Richardson interview, 7 May 1992.
28. U.S. Code, Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Title I, Sec. 118.
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moratorium on exploitation of the seabed by any nation until
an international regime was established.29
Richardson, a Republican who served as Attorney General
for Nixon until his celebrated resignation during Watergate,
played a key role in UNCLOS.

He served as the top American

negotiator from 1977 to 1980. He took the position because of a
deep commitment to the ocean that dated back to his childhood
when he would fish off the coast of Marblehead, Massachusetts,
with his father and send a log of the species of fish he found to
his uncle, Henry B. Bigelow, the first director of the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution. Richardson made ocean issues a
priority throughout his career, prosecuting illegal fishing while
U.S. Attorney in Boston during the 1950s, promoting legislation
to fund ocean research while an aide to Sen. Leverett
Saltonstall, R-Massachusetts, and helping to push for a maJor
Law of the Sea conference in the late 1960s while working for
the Nixon administration. In fact, Richardson went against the
advice of fellow Republicans by accepting the position as Law
of the Sea negotiator in 1977 for a Democratic president. He
recalled in a 1992 interview that his former Deputy Secretary
of Defense, William Clemens, who became governor of Texas,
questioned why he would take the Law of the Sea negotiator
position. Richardson responded: "I said, 'Bill, you may think

29. For Nandan's statement see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment, Hearing on
the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.. 17 August
1978, p. 243.
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Texas is half the world, but I'm dealing with the problems of
two thirds of the earth. "3 o
Richardson came to the negotiations with his own ideas
about the common heritage concept and how it should be
codified. He viewed the concept as it had been articulated by
Lyndon Johnson at the christening of the Oceanographer in
1966. "I thought it would make no sense to allow a competitive
struggle to divide up the seabed. It was a global commons to be
shared. I've never believed the concept meant any more than
that. To me, nothing in the concept foreshadowed the elaborate
structure of the International Seabed Authority." For
Richardson, the practical way to manage the common heritage
was 1) no individual state would be allowed to acquire title to
the seabed 2) exploitation should be done in a way that
contributes to the common interest of mankind 3) there should
be a fair means of sharing the proceeds from mining among
nations 4) there should be a fair and efficient way of
determining who should mine. Checks should be made of
technical capability, environmental safety and financial
resources of any prospective miner and 5) there should be a
body that administers contracts and collects proceeds. Said
Richard.son: "The idea of superimposing a parastatal
organization has always been a nutty idea. "3 1
Richardson blamed the proposed organization of the
International Seabed Authority which was well in place by the
30. Richardson interview, 7 May 1992
31.Ibid.
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time he joined the negotiations in 1977 on promoters of the
New International Economic Order. He said at one point that
linking the NIEO and the common heritage idea emasculated
the common heritage.3 2
Despite these opinions, Richardson was primarily
concerned with creating a treaty and he was willing to make
concessions to the developing countries in the seabed
committee to get a viable package deal. By the mid 1970s, the
major issues in the two other committees had been resolved
and Richardson focused on the seabed ideological deadlock. 3 3
While Richardson attempted to negotiate a settlement,
the mainstream press in America and the U.S. Congress became
increasingly critical of the common heritage concept. Many
critics suggested that it smacked of socialism, a dirty word in
the United States.

Robert A. Goldwin, a political advisor and

former director of Constitutional Studies at the American
Enterprise Institute, strongly criticized the common heritage
concept in Commentary, a neo-conservative publication. He
observed that various nations came to the convention with the
attitude that the common heritage meant joint ownership and
that each country was a stockholder. Goldwin argued that this
concept went against Lockean individualism, the type of
individualism that he said was deeply ingrained in American
political and economic tradition. According to Goldwin's view of
32. Schmidt, Common Heritage of Common Burden?, p. 109.
33. Bernard H. Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
the 1977 New York Session," American Journal of International Law, vol. 72, no. 1
(1978).

89

American capitalism, it is best to encourage private enterprise
to use natural resources with as little regulation as possible. In
turn, private enterprise will create benefits for the good of the
entire society. This belief was exactly the opposite of what
Pardo was saying in his speech, Goldwin concluded. He claimed
that Pardo warned that strong nations and private companies
would dominate seabed resources to the detriment of the world
unless there was some international regime overseeing the
exploration and exploitation of the deep sea.34 Goldwin also
condemned the proposed seabed regime that had been
negotiated at the conference by 1981 as a "complicated, highly
organized, un-elected, powerful government with abundant
funding that can not be controlled or cut off." He concluded
quite simplistically that free enterprise and freedom of the
seas would better serve society .3 5
By the end of the 1970s, pundits m the mainstream press
also criticized the Law of the Sea negotiations on the common
heritage of mankind. New York Times columnist William Safire
blasted seabed negotiations calling them "history's greatest
attempted rip off." He described the draft convention as a "plan
to place ownership in a new bureaucracy ... dominated by the
dictator's of the undeveloped world." He charged that three
presidents had been sailing on the "good ship Guilty
Conscience" and were making an "unnecessary compromise of

34. Robert Goldwin, "Locke and the Law of the Sea," Commentary, vol. 71, no. 6
(June 1981): p. 49.
35. Ibid., p. 50.
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our basic free market principles. "36

The Washington Post

editorial writers accused "Third Worlders" and "Land-based
producers of minerals" of seeking to restrict competition from
seabed mining.

37

The growing discontent with the seabed

negotiations provided a backdrop for President Reagan's 1981
denouncement of the section of the treaty that established a
seabed mining regime.
Richardson stepped down as ambassador in 1980 for
professional reasons. He said he was aware there was an
election approaching and he wanted to reestablish his
Republican credentials. When he stepped down, he said he felt
confident that the treaty was nearly ready for signing and he
said he naively believed it would be signed by the United
States. "Had Carter been re-elected, the treaty would have been
signed," he maintained.38
However, Ronald Reagan was elected president and took
office in January 1981. The Senate also came under Republican
control. On March 2, the State Department issued a statement
that it would ask the U.S. representative at UNCLOS to be sure
the negotiations did not end in the spring session until there
was a policy review. "The interested Departments and Agencies
have begun studies of the serious problems raised by the Draft
Convention ... "39

36.
37.
3.8.
39.
the

In April, Reagan's newly appointed

William Safire, "Very Deep Thoughts," New York Times, 4 July 1977, p. 17.
"American Seabed Mining," Washington Post, 19 July 1978, p. A 14.
Richardson interview, 7 May 1992.
Bernard H. Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
Tenth Session," American Journal of International Law, vol. 76 (1982): p. 2.
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ambassador to UNCLOS, James Malone, told Congress that there
were provisions in the treaty that were upsetting to industry,
Congress and the American public and that were in conflict
with the goals of the Reagan administration.4 O
The American actions in the eleventh hour upset the
developing countries and some developed countries. The
Soviets criticized the Americans for trying to undo a decade of
work by more than 150 countries and charged it was bad faith
negotiation.41

The leader of the Group of 77, Inam Ul-Haque of

Pakistan said: "There have been scores of changes in regimes in
different countries since the work on the treaty was started
but no new regime had so far disowned what its predecessors
had striven to achieve in the field of international cooperation
for the exploitation of the resources of the seabed which have
been universally recognized as being the common heritage of
mankind. "42
Malone stated his objections to the negotiated seabed
regime in an August

5, 1981 statement to UN CLOS. Although

he objected to a number of details of the seabed mining regime,
the overall objection was that the regime went directly against
the Reagan philosophy of least government. "Our government ts
embarked on a course of action designed to reduce inflation
and stimulate productivity. It is also attempting to reduce
burdensome regulations that impede industrial activity. Many
40. Malone testimony quoted by Oxman on page 3 of his review of the Tenth
Session, see note 39.
41. Ibid., p. 5
42. Ibid., p. 6.
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have viewed the Draft Convention as being inconsistent with
these basic goals. "43

Malone objected to what he called

discriminatory advantages given to the "Enterprise," the
internationally controlled mining operation, that would be
funded by the international community and would mine a site
parallel to a site mined by any private company or national
mining operation. He objected to the transfer of technology
stipulations in the treaty, the limits on production that were
established for nickel, to the fact that no seat on the Council
was guaranteed to the United States and that there was a 20year review provision that could alter the entire regime by a
vote the United States could not controI.44
Elliot Richardson, although no longer part of UNCLOS
negotiations, spoke before Congress to object to the content of
Malone's statements. He said that the treaty provisions for
membership on the council allow for Western industrialized
nations to have 6-9 seats. "The United States, either as
probably the largest investor in deep seabed mining or as the
largest importer or consumer of deep seabed minerals would
have as much practical assurance of being named to one of
these groups ... " Richardson testified before the House Foreign
Affairs · Committee.45 He also pointed out that the treaty said
43. Myron H. Nordquist and Choon-ho Park, eds., Reports of the United States
Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Occasional Paper No. 33 (Honolulu: The Law of the Sea Institute, University of
Hawaii, 1983), p. 528.
44. Oxman, Tenth Session, p. 9.
45. For text of Richardson speech see U.S. Congress, House, Foreign Affairs
Committee, U.S. Policy and the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 97th
Cong., 1st sess., 14 May, 1981, pp. 27-51.
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that technology transfer would occur with adequate
compensation. He noted that a number of companies have
already offered to sell technology to the Enterprise.
The Reagan administration decided that it would not
accept Part XI - the seabed portion of the treaty - unless major
changes were .made. But the other nations, many disgusted
with the United States for its last minute demands, decided to
adopt the treaty with or without U.S. support.46

So when the

signing ceremony was held in 1982, the United States refused
to sign and remains today the leading developed nation
boycotting the treaty. It has also urged a number of other
developed nations to withhold ratification of the treaty because
of the seabed regime. U.S. Ambassador Thomas Clingan
announced at the treaty signing ceremony in Montego Bay,
Jamaica that the U.S. viewed the parts of the convention
dealing with navigation, overflight, the exclusive economic
zone, innocent passage and the territorial sea as part of
"prevailing international practice," however the United States
could not accept the seabed portions. 4 7
A total of 117 nations signed the final act and to date
there have been 51 ratifications. The treaty will go into effect
one year after the 60th ratification signature is deposited. 4 8

46. Oxman, Tenth Session, p. 21. The vote on the convention on 30 April 1982 was
130-4, with 17 abstentions. See The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in
I.L.M. vol. XXI, no. 6, November 1982.
47. Nordquist and Park, Reports of the United States Delegation, p. 665.
48. The 1982 U.N. Conv. on the L.O.S., Part XVII, Articles 305-308.
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The countries that have ratified the treaty are predominantly
the developing countries of the world
The seabed regime m the final treaty was a mixture of
elements from proposals by the United States and Third World
nations.

However, as with each of the early proposals, the

statement about the common heritage of mankind remained
largely unchanged from the 1970 Declaration of Principles. The
international seabed area and its resources were to be the
common heritage of mankind.49

It was defined as the area

beyond the limits of national jurisdiction - that is beyond the
exclusive economic zone and/or the continental shelf.
Other components of the common heritage of mankind
expressed by Pardo in 1967 were present in the treaty. Article
137 stated that no state could claim sovereignty over the area
or the resources. The article went further to state that all rights
to the resources were "vested in mankind as a whole, on whose
behalf the Authority shall act. "50

Article 140 states that there

will be preferences. The regime should take "into particular
consideration the interests and needs of the developing States
and of peoples who have not attained full independence or
other self-governing status ... "51

The regime also promoted

cooperation in marine scientific research and assistance to
developing countries to strengthen research activities and
transfer technology .52
49.

Ibid.,
50. Ibid.,
51. Ibid.,
52. Ibid.,

The United States and other developed

Art. 136.
Art. 137, no. 2.
Art 140, no. 1.
Art. 143.
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nations influenced the wording of the technology transfer
sections to ensure that transfers were not required, nor free.
They were encouraged at fair market rates.5 3
The seabed section also created the International Seabed
Authority which would grant contracts for seabed mining. One
of the major economic compromises between countries that
promoted free-market economics and those that favored
planned economies was the creation of the parallel mining
system. Instead of adopting the idea promoted by the
developing countries that the International Seabed Authority
should run the mining operations exclusively,

or adopting the

developed-nation view that there should be a relatively weak
licensing board to regulate private mining companies, the
treaty said there would be both. Whenever a private company
wanted to mine a site, the company would have to propose two
sites, one to be awarded to the company and the other to be
reserved for the Enterprise to mine.5 4
The treaty's Article 150 declared that there would be
some assistance given to co.untries in which seabed mining had
a negative effect on a mineral-export national economy.
Article 151 explains that there will be a ceiling on nickel
production. Because nickel is one of the four major components
of manganese nodules, a ceiling on it established automatic
ceilings on the other minerals which exist in relatively
consistent proportions in the nodules. The treaty describes
53. Ibid., Annex III, Art. 5, no. 3, a.
54. Ibid., Annex III, Art. 8.
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specifically how this ceiling will be set and it says there will be
a way of compensating developing countries that are adversely
affected by the ceiling.5 5
The treaty established a Preparatory Commission that
would include all signatories to the convention. There are
currently 159 nations that have signed. This group works
together using consensus negotiations to draft provisional deep
seabed mining regulations.56

Over the last nine years, the

Preparatory Commission has resolved a number of issues, but
has yet to resolve the hard-core issues such as how to
compensate land-based mineral producers, how to include
observers that are not members of the treaty and whether
decisions will be made by vote or consensus.5 7
The commission's most important accomplishment

ts that

it has registered the Soviet Union, Japan, France, India, China
and a group of former Eastern European nations as "pioneer
investors. "58

This means that these countries or consortiums

operating in these countries have received · a portion of the
international deep seabed for exploration and exploitation. This
was no simple feat. It required extensive negotiations to
resolve overlapping claims in the Pacific Ocean area called the
Clarion~Clipperton

Zone. Scientific studies have pointed a

55.
56.

Ibid., Art. 151, no. 4.
Ibid., Annex I.
57. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Policy News, vol. ix, no. 3 (March 1992): p. 1-2.
58. Moritaka Hayashi, "Registration of the First Group of Pioneer Investors by the
Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea," Ocean Development and
International Law, vol. 20, (1989): p. 1-33.
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substantial volume of manganese nodules with high
concentrations of nickel and cobalt in this area of the Pacific.5 9
The Preparatory Commission has also succeeded in
resolving overlapping seabed claims with mining consortiums
from three industrialized nations that have refused to sign the
treaty because of the seabed regime. 60

These consortiums are

registered for seabed mining in their respective countries
under national legislation that was passed in the early 1980s
following the the American Deep Seabed Hard Mineral
Resources Act. They include consortiums registered in the
United States, the United Kingdom and Germany.

There was a

point in Preparatory Commission negotiations when the
spokesmen from both the lesser developed countries and the
Soviet Union condemned as illegal these outside mining laws
and registrants. However, in the late 1980s, Preparatory
Commission members decided that encouraging an
international regime was more important than fueling a
standoff between competing regimes so the· commission took
steps to resolve overlapping claims. The

hope is that these

industrialized countries will eventually join the treaty. The
Third World countries that dominate the commission also
recogniZe that the industrialized countries will be significant
financial contributors, technological and scientific advisors to
the international seabed regime and the Enterprise operation.

59. Padan, Commercial Recovery, pp. 98-99.
60. Hayaski, Registration of the First Group of Pioneer Investors, p. 23.
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Another trend in the Preparatory Commission has been a
softening of the ideological line that dominated UNCLOS; there
have been expressions by Third World leaders that the market
economy approach is not as abhorrent as it was perceived in
the 1970s.

An example of the softening is the resolution of

overlapping seabed claims. Preparatory Commission ensured
that the International Seabed Authority had a prime mining
site in the center of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. However it did
not always require each pioneer investor to present a site of
equal size to the one it wanted to explore. This was a softening
of the rigid site-for-site parallel system in the convention.61
A conciliatory effort is apparent in a statement by
Ambassador Jose Luis Jesus of Cape Verde, chairman of the
Preparatory Commission, to the United Nations General
Assembly on December 10, 1991.

He said:

"the problems that we face today in part XI were born
out of assumptions made in past negotiations that have
proved, only 10 years later, to be at .odds with today's
realities. We should therefore learn the lesson and
exercise restraint in attempting to find solutions today
for the seabed mining system on the basis of assumptions
that might most likely prove to be in contradiction with
the facts and realities of tomorrow's world. "6 2
The UN resolution that Jesus put forward said "the
Assembly would recognize that political and economic changes,
including particularly a growing reliance on market principles,
underscored the need to re-evaluate, in light of the issues of
61. Ibid., p. 15.
62. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Policy News, vol. ix, no. 1 (January 1992): p. 2.
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concern to some states, matters in the regime to be applied to
the Area and its resources and that a productive dialogue on
such issues involving all interested parties would facilitate the
prospect of universal participation in the Convention, for the
benefit of mankind as a whole."63
Former UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar began an
effort in 1990 to resolve problems in the seabed regime. These
informal talks involve Preparatory Commission members and
industrialized nations. They are continuing under the new
Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali, who was instrumental in
urging his country, Egypt, to ratify UNCLOS.64

There is hope

that a resolution will be made and there is a strong likelihood
that nine more nations will ratify the treaty in the upcoming
years, bringing it into force. The United States, however, may
still be reluctant to ratify the treaty unless some major changes
are made to the seabed regime, or an election brings a new
president with a different perspective than that taken in the
last decade by Presidents Reagan and Bush.
Although the U.S. rejection of the seabed mining regime
had a negative effect on the common heritage concept, it was
the economics of mineral mining that dealt the most serious
blow to seabed mining in the 1980s. While mineral shortages
and Third World mineral cartels were feared in the early
1970s a quite different situation occurred in the 1980s. In
1984, Marne Dubs, manager of Kennecott Consortium's
63. Ibid., 2-3
Dolliver Nelson, Executive Secretary of Preparatory Commission, Law of the Sea
Office for the U.N. Secretariat, telephone interview with author, 20 May 1992.

64.
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manganese nodule project throughout the 1970s, pronounced
that "commercial interest in seabed resources is close to its
nadir." Even the land-based mines that produced these metals
at much lower costs than would be possible in a seabed
operation were suffering. The economic forecast has been that
metal prices will "languish for the rest of the century and well
into the 21st century.65
It was also clear by the end of the 1970s that Americans
were not committed to the same common heritage concept as
the developing nations. In a speech before the Washington
Press Club on March 14, 1979, Elliott Richardson said, "We are
convinced that nations retain their rights to mine the deep
oceans as one of the freedoms of the seas. "66

What Richardson

said in 1979 was the opposite of what President Johnson had
said in the 1966 speech in which he called ocean wealth the
"legacy of all mankind" and warned against its being taken only
by the wealthy nations.

But President Johnson had never been

asked to shift from the broad philosophical ·idea of a common
heritage of mankind to the specifics of establishing an
internationally controlled business that could satisfy
diametrically opposed economic philosophies.
Under the demanding policy-making arena, the common
heritage concept unravelled.

The United States could embrace

the broad concept of a global commons, but could not accept a
65.

Marne Dubs, "Minerals of the Deep Sea: Myth and Reality," In Giulio
Pontecorvo, ed., The New Order of The Oceans (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986), p. 89.
66. Department of State Bulletin, no. 60, 14 March 1979.
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highly complex government that would oversee three-quarters
of the earth, regulate and run a mining industry in this area.
Third World nations also were selective in which components
of Pardo's concept they embraced. They infused the concept
with their own desires for price controls, technology transfers
and fees on private industry engaged in mining. They wanted
too place the financial burden on mining nations for funding for
the internationally run mining operation - the Enterprise.
The concept also suffered during the 1970s as the deep
ocean faded from a relatively high position on the foreign
policy agenda. Other domestic and foreign policy concerns
including the Vietnam War, the oil embargo and the Iranian
hostage crisis took its place. President Jimmy Carter did not
view ocean policy as an important form of international
relations as did Presidents Johnson or Nixon. 67

And President

Reagan saw no need to make any concessions on seabed mining
to the Third World.
The United Nations and Third World ·leaders continued to
support the seabed regime and have been willing in recent
years to make compromises with industrialized nations to
resolve disputes on overlapping seabed mining sites for the
future. ·To date, these efforts have not convinced the United
States to sign the treaty or to participate, even as an observer,
at the Preparatory Commission meetings. These meetings are
67. Richardson interview, 7 May 1992. See also L. King and F. Jennings, "The
and the Oceans: Three Decades of United States Marine Policy," Marine
Technology Society Journal , vol. 22, (1988): p. 17-32.
~xecutive
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the

place where the United States could push for changes to

the seabed regime. The other forum for reconciliation is a
series of informal meetings launched by the UN SecretaryGeneral. There have been no major breakthroughs at these
meetings, but U.S. participation continues. There is some hope a
resolution will be made here.
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Conclusion

In 1983, Arvid Pardo declared " ... the common
heritage regime established for the international seabed is little
short of a disaster." 1

But nearly 10 years later, Elizabeth Mann

Borgese believes the regime is the most advanced form of
governance ever created by man. From her home in Halifax,
Nova Scotia, she is still working to get the required 60 nations
to ratify the treaty.2

To date, 51 nations have ratified or

acceded to the treaty. They are predominantly small or
developing nations. The only industrial nation to ratify the
treaty is Iceland.3

The larger industrial nations that once

controlled international ocean law, including many of the
nations capable of mining the deep seabed, have refused to
ratify the treaty because of the seabed mining regime.
The concept of the common heritage as defined by Arvid
Pardo in 1967 was vague and open to a multitude of
interpretations. That was part of its beauty as a rallying slogan
for a diverse group of advocates and nations.

But it was also its

downfall as a concrete framework for an economic endeavor
such as mining. The people who rallied for the common .
heritage were unsuccessful in turning the philosophy into a

1. Arvid Pardo, "The Convention on the Law of the Sea: a Preliminary Appraisal,"
San Diego Law Review, vol. 20, no. 2 (April 1983): p. 499.
2: Elisabeth Mann Borgese, personal interview with author, Halifax, Canada, 1
November 1991.
3. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Policy News, vol. ix, no. 1 (January 1992): p. 4.
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viable economic system.

The advocates were good at saying

that the new concept was neither sovereignty nor freedom of
the seas, neither capitalism nor socialism, but they were unable
to clearly define what it was.

It is an idea much closer to

socialism because it involves common property.

This was one

of the main reasons it was never embraced fully by policymakers and leaders of the United States - a nation that was
founded on the sanctity of private property.
The common heritage was an idea born at the right time,
but one that matured in a more difficult political environment.
Pardo, President Lyndon Johnson and Borgese began speaking
about a common heritage in the oceans at a time in the late
1960s when the world was searching for answers to global
problems of inequality and poverty. It was also a time when
people were willing to strongly criticize the capitalistic
economies of the developed world. But as the idea moved into
the policy-making arena in the 1970s, it became the job of
more practically-minded people to create· a common heritage
regime.
Many of the delegates to UNCLOS, unlike Pardo and
Borgese, had national, not necessarily international interests at
heart. They were realists not idealists. The delegates from
Third World nations developed and embraced the highlynationalistic concept of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone an extension of national territory into what had been the high
seas. They also wanted a deep seabed regime that brought the
poorer nations as much financial, technological and legal
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benefits as possible and the least amount of disruption to any
mineral export income they had. And they liked the idea of
creating a new form of international law with their stamp on it.
The delegates from the United States did not have the
same desire to create a new order of the oceans as their
counterparts from the Third World. Elliot Richardson, the U.S.
Ambassador to the Law of the Sea conference from 1977 to
1980, was much more concerned with getting a treaty in place
that satisfied a range of American concerns including the desire
to stop creeping jurisdiction by the world's new nations.

He

viewed the seabed regime with its benefits for the Third World
as part of the "package deal" established at the beginning of
UNCLOS. The developed nations would ask for cooperation from
the Third World on navigation and environmental issues that
were important to them. In return, the developed nations
would give the developing countries benefits such as a share of
seabed wealth, technology transfers, regional oceanographic
centers and participation m a new international mining
organization.
Although Richardson was willing to make this bargain
and was willing to accept a number of demands from the Third
World, · President Reagan was ultimately unwilling to make such
a bargain. It is doubtful that the Republican-controlled U.S.
Senate with its responsibility for approving international
treaties would have consented to such a bargain either. In a
decade, the type of idealism that marked the Johnson
administration's war on poverty and Food for Peace program
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had evaporated. The 1970s had been difficult years for
Americans and the years had taxed the nation's sympathy for
international solutions that depended in U.S. generosity. The
Vietnam War, the OPEC oil embargo and the Iranian Hostage
Crisis helped to rob Americans of international idealism and
sympathy for the Third World. The 1990s have seen no
reversal of this trend.

There is no economic or political need

today to court the Third World by making concessions such as
accepting what is viewed as a socialistic seabed mining
regime.4
The problem of designing an economic enterprise that
satisfies countries that believe in the free market and those
that feel disadvantaged in the free market and advocate more
government control, is a task on the agenda of future
international treaty negotiations.

Future negotiations will be

affected by recent historic developments that call into question
the state-controlled economy and highlight some advantages of
the market-approach.

The fall of communism and state-

controlled economies in Eastern Europe will contribute to
changes in the attitude of some of the Third World nations that
vehemently pushed for a powerful government-controlled
seabed ·authority.

There is already evidence at the Law of the

Sea Preparatory Commission that Third World leaders are
softening their stance on demands that the Enterprise be given
exactly the same size seabed area for mining as any private or
4. Jane Perlez, "Stranded by Superpowers, Africa Seeks an Identity," New York
Times (May 17, 1992), p. 1.
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national mining operation. The New International Economic
Order is no longer the battle cry. If the conference on the Law
of the Sea were held today, an entirely different common
heritage regime for the seabed might be written based on the
recent criticism of interventionist state economic policies, the
high cost of mining, the decreased world demand for these
minerals and the increased environmental concern for the deep
ocean.
Americans are recognizing these changes. A number of
marine policy leaders including Elliot Richardson, Marne Dubs
and Senator Claiborne Pell have urged the resolution of these
differences and the ratification of a universal Law of the Sea
treaty. Elliot Richardson pointed out in 1990 that the
developing countries were now more willing to make
compromises with developed countries. He said: "Even among
the Group of 77 the NIEO no longer has many true believers,
and the Enterprise has lost much of its mystique." Richardson
urged the U.S. to stop its boycott of Preparatory Commission
talks. "It should want to take advantage of any opportunity to
correct the defects of Part XI. While Part XI is not nearly as bad
as the Reagan administration made it out to be, it can and
should · be significantly improved. "5

Richardson believes that

seabed mining will eventually take place even if it is not the
great bonanza that was predicted.

5. Elliot Richardson, "Law of the Sea: A Reassessment of U.S. Interests,"
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 2 (1990): p. 10.
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Richardson is not alone in supporting an international
regime for seabed mining. Even some mining industry officials
who lobbied in Congress for national seabed mining legislation
have softened their criticism of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea seabed regime and have
reconsidered their support of national regulation. Marne Dubs,
formerly Kennecott Consortium's manganese nodule project
manager, stated in 1984 that he and other industry spokesmen
promoted a myth that technology transfer was a pariah to
American seabed mining companies who wanted to protect
their competitive commercial advantage. Dubs said the reality
was that seabed investors have "little or nothing worth
protecting and even any marginal value is rapidly disappearing
with the passage of time." He explained that the technology for
seabed mining was not top secret and much of it was adapted
from offshore oil drilling technology. 6
Dubs also said it was a myth that the seabed provisions
would prohibit private enterprise from investing in mining. He
said the reality is that rules and regulations could be developed
by the Preparatory Commission to satisfy private investment.
Dubs concluded that the first ocean mining that will occur will
be government subsidized because the expense is too much for
private enterprise to take on.7

He suggested it was an

American myth promoted in the 1970s that pure private
6. Marne Dubs, "Minerals of the Deep Sea: Myth and Reality," In Giulio Pontecorvo,
ed., The New Order of the Oceans (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.
102.
7. Ibid., p. 121.
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enterprise was the best and only way to see the riches of
seabed exploited for the betterment to mankind.
Senator Claiborne Pell has continually urged the United
States to stop boycotting the Preparatory Commission and
attend as an observer with the goal of resolving differences
and eventually signing the treaty. "We must take off our
ideological cloaks," Pell said in a 1991 interview. 8 I also
believe this is what the United States should do.
Despite the failure of the seabed regime to translate into
mining and tangible benefits for the lesser developed countries,
there were successes in the common heritage movement. The
primary success was that the idea of a shared resource that
belongs to mankind as a whole is now a permanent concept in
international law and marine policy. Its repetition in United
Nations resolutions, its definition in the Law of the Sea Treaty
and its association with a clearly defined geographic area - the
deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction all led to making it a
part of marine law and geography.
The common heritage concept also gave a new field marine affairs - a central idea to examine and rally behind. It
excited a small, but fervent group of nongovernmental
organiz.ations that tried to influence international manne
policy. Today nongovernmental organizations are thriving and
raising their voices at other international negotiations, some
marine-related, others related to broader environmental
concerns. They are a vital force that will only increase as
8. Sen. Claiborne Pell, telephone interview with author, 2 December 1991.
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environmental problems become more real to the general
public and as the wealth gap between rich and poor nations,
and between rich and poor peoples within nations, continues to
threaten international and national stability.
The common heritage movement is also an example of
how successful a small group of people can be in promoting an
idealistic international legal concept. The idea, although initially
supported by the United States government, was most strongly
and clearly articulated by Arvid Pardo, an Ambassador from
Malta. It drew a handful of advocates from the United States
and a small group of scholarly advocates in Europe. A number
of governmental leaders and statesmen from the Third World
were spokesmen for the concept. The common heritage idea
was one of the main reasons the United Nations convened the
world's largest Law of the Sea conference. Devising a regime for
the common heritage area of the deep seabed was the only
reason negotiations lagged beyond the mid-1970s. This is
evidence that the idea challenged people. · It is also evidence
that the idea

had something in it to satisfy different political

philosophies. The lengthy negotiations also reflected the fact
that the idea was to be used to regulate a large area of earth
that is ·little understood. The idea tapped into a belief in the
importance of establishing places on earth that are not owned
by nations and are protected for the future. Many societies
have recognized the morality of sharing the earth's natural
resources in an equitable manner. But the actual practice of
international resource management remains in its infancy.
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The success of the common heritage movement in making
the idea a permanent part of philosophy suggests that a larger,
more powerful constituency for the oceans might promote
similar ideas. In recent years, the constituency for the oceans
has grown, but not as a constituency focused on the deep sea.
Instead, the growth has been among the numbers of advocates
for coastal area issues such as pollution cleanup, fish and
mammal conservation. In the United States, attention shifted
from the deep seabed and its wealth to the coastal zone in the
1970s. The problems of pollution, human health and overfishing were much more immediate than a mining proposition
for the deep seabed. Just as the more immediate concept of the
exclusive economic zone became one of the most significant
changes negotiated at UNCLOS and broadly accepted by the
world, the more tangible coastal issues draw a constituency
that deep ocean issues have yet to attract. The reason is that
people need to feel connected to what they are discussing and
promoting. It was always difficult for people to feel connected
to the remote and dark seabed. It took idealists such as Borgese
to grasp the abstract idea that a regime for the deep seabed
was a worthy cause to spend one's life trying to achieve.
There are two distinct views on whether the principle of
the common heritage of mankind is. a part of international law.
A number of

developing nations argued that the principle was

a part of law. The representative from Trinidad and Tobago at
UNCLOS said "the principle of the common heritage of mankind
is not new law, it is not constitutive but rather declaratory of
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existing law. "9

But legal scholars from the west such as

Christopher Joyner countered that the common heritage of
mankind principle did not meet the requirements of customary
or conventional international law because first of all the treaty
has yet to be ratified by enough countries to bring it into force.
Moreover, the principle also failed to meet criteria as
customary law. He said it had not become part of state practice.
Instead, Joyner concluded the principle was part of philosophy;
it was "a conceptual ideal not an international legal reality
supported by state practice." 1 o
Joyner is right that the common heritage is currently part
of international legal philosophy. It will become international
conventional law if nine more countries ratify the treaty. This
may mean that the industrialized countries that have national
legislation regulating seabed mining will be violating
international law. This should be a concern of the United States,
Germany and the United Kingdom - three of the countries that
have refused to sign or ratify the treaty and have adopted
national legislation.

The U.S. legislation is called an interim law

and is supposed to be superseded by an international treaty
that 1s accepted by the U.S. However, there is a section of the
law entitled "Transition to International Agreement" which

9. Milan Bulajic, Principles of International Development Law (Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 311.
10. Christopher C. Joyner, "Legal Implications of the Concept of The Common
Heritage of Mankind," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 35
(1986): p. 73. See also Paul L. Saffo, "The Common Heritage of Mankind: Has the
General Assembly Created a Law to Govern Seabed Mining?" Tulane Law Review. vol.
53 (1979): p. 492-520.
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includes a list of what Congress demands the international
agreement contain. The most important item on the list is that
the international treaty is not to "impose significant new
economic burdens upon such citizens with respect to such
operations with the effect of preventing the continuation of
such operations on a viable economic basis." 11 As the treaty
stands today, it would impose additional fees on an American
miner that the U.S. law does not require.
Applying the concept of the common heritage of mankind
to the deep seabed was a vehicle for Pardo and Borgese. They
needed a place to give birth to their concept of cooperative
international relations. The developing countries that promoted
the concept of the common heritage wanted to make it a piece
of a New International Economic Order. American diplomats
went to UNCLOS resolved to curb creeping jurisdiction and
maintain navigational freedom. They viewed the common
heritage as a way to halt unilateral claims on increasingly
larger areas of the ocean. They also viewed it as a bargaining
chip to use with Third Woild nations. Americans benefited
from the effect the common heritage concept had on preserving
the deep seabed from creeping national claims.

Yet Americans

also passed unilateral legislation giving American miners the
right to make unilateral claims to mme the deep seabed.
American policy-makers wanted it both ways. This conflict is
an embarrassment to the United States. However, President
11. U.S. Code, Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Public Law 96-283, Title
II, June 28, 1980.
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George Bush and his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, have refused
to acknowledge this hypocritical position. Both presidents, prior
to taking office, had voiced strong opposition to the concept of
the common heritage. It is unlikely the conflict will be resolved
in the near future. It may only be resolved when it becomes
practical or economical for the United States to join the
international agreement. This may only occur if mining is
viewed as economically viable or necessary.
Although the common heritage of mankind concept is not
yet part of international ocean law, the concept has become
part of international space law. The common heritage of
mankind is a central component of the "Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,"
a treaty finalized in 1979. Article X, paragraph I states that:
"The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage
of mankind." Echoing Pardo's delineation of the concept of the
common heritage, the moon treaty states that the moon and its
natural resources shall not be "subject to · national appropriation
by any claim of sovereignty .. " The treaty also ensures freedom
of scientific investigation and that the moon and its resources
will be used for "the betterment of all peoples, not just for
those who possess the technological wherewithal to exploit
them."12

12.

Space Treaty quoted in Joyner, p. 197. See also Peter D. Nesgos, "The Proposed
IIiternational Sea-Bed Authority as a Model for the Future Outer Space
International Regime," Annals of Air and Space Law (Toronto: Carswell Company
Limited, 1980), p. 549.
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The use of the common heritage concept in ocean and
space law has contributed to a humanist trend in international
law, a change in international law that theorists say is
gradually occurring. This change is a shift from law as a way of
policing nations and promoting military security to law as a
way of promoting welfare concerns such as the environment,
human advancement and anti-poverty.13

This trend is

expected to continue as more small, developing nations push
for greater recognition and greater influence on international
law and economics. UNCLOS was the first treaty negotiation
that brought together as large a number of the world's
countries to discuss international law. Another trend that has
been seen since UNCLOS is a gradual shift in world leadership
from traditional powers such as the United States and Europe
to other nations such as Japan.
The recent conference that brought together an even
larger number of countries than UNCLOS was the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
J aniero. One of the major issues at this conference was
determining how to slow global deforestation. The issue pit the
industrialized nations who advocate rain forest preservation
against a number of poverty-stricken developing nations that
look to their rain fores ts as economic mainstays and view their
decisions about these forests as a sovereign right. The idea that
nature in general and rain fores ts in particular are part of the
tJ. Edward McWhinney, D. Ross, G. Tunkin, eds., From Coexistence to Cooperation:
International Law and Organization in the Post-Cold War Era (Boston: Martinus

Nijhoff Publishers,

1991).
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common heritage of humankind underlies the argument of a
number of nations that want to participate in decisions about
these valuable resources. The phrase common heritage has
been used in newspaper articles and applied to rain fores ts to
describe one of the central issues of the conference.1 4
The global visionaries - represented most vocally by the
nongovernmental environmental organizations - are once again
urging that nature be considered the common heritage of
humankind and be protected for this and future generations by
a cooperative international treaty. Although resources such as
rain forests may never be declared the common heritage in
international law, the fact that people view them as such may
increase the chance they will receive some global protection.
The environment - atmosphere, oceans and forests - is the new
global issue that demands cooperation as seabed mining
demanded it in the 1970s. These resources are much less
obscure than minerals on the floor of the ocean and there is a
greater chance that international policy will be devised for
environmental protection. The Third World has a much better
bargaining position to get demands of aid and technology
transfer in environmental diplomacy than it did with seabed
mining.' In the 1970s, the Third World played on the guilt of
developed nations when it tried to promote cooperation,
technology transfers and developed nation-funding of seabed
mining. The Third World needed to be given the technology to
14. Marlise Simons, "North-South Divide Marring Environment Talks," New York
Times (March 17, 1992): p. AS.

117

participate in such an economic enterprise. Today, the Third
World can demonstrate that the developed countries are
responsible for much of the environmental degradation to the
atmosphere. The Third World can use this scientific arguments
to demand technology that will help its nations curb
environmental problems that might accompany development.
The Third World also controls much of the world's rain forests.
This gives these nations leverage in negotiations about
preserving these forests.

15

As far as the oceans are concerned, the concept of the
common heritage rules the seabed by default. Developed
countries do not have the interest to engage in seabed mmmg.
When and if there is economic demand for the seabed minerals,
the common heritage concept will probably continue to dictate
the way both developed and developing nations engage in the
activity. At this point, the developed nations may see a need to
resolve the more technical disagreements in the treaty and
may then join it. Until then, the idea of including the nations of
the world in the management of a global commons remains a
goal that internationalists will continue to preach in marine
policy as well as global environmental policy.
There is a need for this type of idealism even if it never
translates into concrete policy. It has an effect on policy and
contributes to larger trends in international relations. The idea
of the common heritage is unlikely to galvanize people from
15. Paul Lewis, "Negotiations in Rio Agree to Increase Aid to Third World," New
York Times (14 June 1992): p. 1, sect. 1.
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different nations in the way it did briefly at the end of the
1960s, however, there is a chance that leadership from people
who do not fall into ideological camps could succeed in
international ocean affairs.
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NAMES OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Elisabeth Mann Borgese, founder of the International Ocean
Institute and former delegate from Austria to the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Halifax, Canada, 1
November 1991. Correspondence, 12 February 1992.
Marne Dubs, manager of Kennecott Consortium's manganese
nodule, former advisor to the U.S. delegation to UNCLOS.
Narragansett, RI, 23 July 1991.
Miriam Levering, Ocean Education Project, correspondence, 4
October 1991.
Dolliver Nelson, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory
Commission, Law of the Sea Office for the U.N. Secretariat.
Telephone interview, 20 May 1992.
Arvid Pardo, former Ambassador to the United Nations from
Malta. Telephone interview, 2 December 1991 and
correspondence, 11 February 1992.
Senator Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island's U.S. Senator. Telephone
interview, 2 December 1991.
Elliot Richardson, former Ambassador-at-Large, Special
Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea and
currently a senior partner at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy.
Telephone interview, 7 May 1992
Barbara Weaver, United Methodist Church, Women's Division
Board of Global Ministries, formerly a member of the Neptune
Group and the Methodist Church Law of the Sea Project. New
York City, 20 September 1991.
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